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The continuous expansion of Middle Eastern airlines has created a pilot shortage.  Since 
the local pilot population in the Middle East is relatively small, airlines have been relying 
on foreign pilots to satisfy their operational requirements.  Consequently, pilots with 
diverse cultural perspectives have been operating together.  In order to manage this 
cultural diversity and ensure safe operations, airlines have been applying a number of 
training and operational strategies such as Crew Resource Management (CRM) with 
emphasis on adherence to Standard Operating Procedures (SOP).  However, CRM was 
designed and implemented by North Americans as a solution for human factor intricacies 
among North American pilots, and thus, CRM is not culturally calibrated to 
accommodate pilots from other regions in the world. 
  The analyses of Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) information 
acquired from a Middle Eastern airline aided in understanding the influences of cultural 
diversity on airline operations.  This analysis helped in understanding the impact of cross-
culture among airline pilots on three relevant unsafe performance events: hard landings, 
unstable approaches, and pilot deviations.   
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 The study was conducted using a descriptive comparative method to analyze the 
relationship between unsafe performance events and captain / first officer nationality 
combinations during flights where performance events were recorded.  The flight data 
were retrieved from an unchanged flight data-recording environment yielding robust 
detailed data that was combined with administrative demographic data.  
Tests of associations were used to understand the relationship between unsafe 
performance events and nationality combinations.  These associations were illustrated 
through multi-dimensional chi-square tests.  A comparison of cross-cultural and 
homogeneous flight deck crew combinations from unsafe performance events was 
examined.  Additional analyses were conducted to predict group membership through 
discriminant analysis and multinomial logistic regression.  
Several Spearman’s r correlation tests were conducted to assess the influence of 
intervening demographic variables on the association between nationality combinations 
and unsafe performance events.  While cause-and-effect relationships between variables 
could not be determined in this research design, association variations between variables 
were made evident.  ANCOVA statistical tests were conducted to control for the effect 
of: age of captains / first officers, airport destinations, and eligibility to command the 
flight on the relationship between nationality combination and unsafe performance 
events. 
The Spearman’s rank correlation test indicated significant weak correlation 
between destination airport and unsafe performance events, as well as, eligibility to 
command the flight and unsafe performance events.  A 7 by 7 multi-dimensional         
chi-square test indicated that there was a relationship between certain pilot nationality 
v 
combinations and unsafe performance events categories for pilot deviations and all 
unsafe performance events together.  Moreover, the discriminant analysis test results 
showed that there was a significant effect of some nationality combinations on unsafe 
performance events.  
Results obtained from the analyses buttress the literature that certain cultural traits 
and beliefs influence pilots’ behavior and attitudes and may jeopardize safety levels. 
CRM skills may be weakened as a result of heterogeneous nationality combinations.  It is 
recommended to conduct further research on current CRM training concepts in order to 
improve its effectiveness among cross-cultural crewmembers.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this dissertation is to determine if cross-cultural flight deck crew 
composition is related to increased error levels.  Flight Operational Quality Assurance 
(FOQA) information was analyzed with special emphasis on pilots’ national cultures.  
The data were retrieved from an airline in the United Arab Emirates (UAE).  Principles of 
aircrew performances and aircraft operations, such as Crew Resource Management 
(CRM) and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), have been taken into consideration in 
this study when defining errors and deviations committed by pilots. 
The UAE 
 Stretched across the southeastern tip of the Arabian Peninsula, the UAE’s 
geographical location is considered an economic passage between the West and East 
(Zoubir, 1999).  Since the discovery of oil in the 1950s, the UAE has experienced an era 
of economic development transforming it into a prominent hub for international 
commerce, trade, and tourism (Zoubir, 1999).  In 2000, the UAE was estimated to have 
10% of the world oil reserves (Al Abed & Hellyer, 2001).  Endowed with considerable 
oil reserves and being aware of declining natural resources, the UAE government has 
diversified its economic strengths through investments in various industries, such as air 
transportation (Verpermann, Wald, & Gleich, 2008). 
Aviation in the UAE  
The UAE has established itself as a global competitor in the aviation sector.  
Airlines in the UAE transported over 56 million passengers and 3 million tons of 
airfreight in 2009 (Oxford Economics, 2009).  The aviation sector supports the UAE’s 
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economy by generating more than U.S. $39.47 billion, which is 14.7% of UAE’s Gross 
Domestic Product (Jones, 2012).  Furthermore, the aviation sector provides over 224,000 
jobs in the UAE with an average annual salary of U.S. $86,000 (Oxford Economics, 
2009). 
 In 2008, aircraft orders by operators in the UAE and other Middle Eastern 
countries were valued at $40 billion (Vespermann et al., 2008).  These expansion 
strategies would enable Middle Eastern carriers to increase their network and flight 
frequencies across the globe.  The wide body aircraft orders placed in 2008, as illustrated 
in Figure 1, show the expansion commitment among Middle Eastern carriers. 
 
 
Figure 1. Wide body fleet expansion plans of Middle Eastern carriers. Adapted from 
“Aviation Growth in the Middle East - Impacts on Incumbent Players and Potential 
Strategic Reactions,” by Vespermann et al., 2008, Journal of Transport Geography, 
16(16), 388-394. Copyright 2008 by Elsevier. 
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General Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA).  In parallel with the European Joint 
Aviation Requirements (JAR), the GCAA has been structured to govern and regulate 
aviation activities in the UAE (GCAA, 2013b).  The GCAA is aimed at establishing and 
maintaining standardized safety performances among local operators (GCAA, 2013a).  
Required operational standards and safety levels are defined by the GCAA through 
published regulations that address minimum operational requirements and procedures 
(GCAA, 2013a). 
Nationals versus Expatriates.  As of July 2012, the population in the UAE 
reached 5,314,317 (Central Intelligence Agency, 2012).  However, only 19% of the total 
population in the UAE are nationals, while 81% of the total population in the UAE is 
comprised of a wide array of nationalities, predominantly Asians, commonly referred to 
as expatriates (Central Intelligence Agency, 2012).  NatWest International Personal 
Banking Quality of Life Index ranked the UAE as the third favorite place to live among 
expatriates due to its tax-free environment, job opportunities, and overall quality of life 
(Ferguson, 2013). 
Expatriates account for most of the population in Middle Eastern countries, such 
as the UAE, comprising nearly 84% of the total population (United Nations [UN], 2005).  
In contrast, while expatriates dominate the Middle East, the majority of the European 
population is comprised of nationals.  The highest percentage of expatriates in Europe is 
Luxembourg at 30%, followed by Switzerland at 20% (UN, 2005). 
The critical imbalance between nationals and expatriates in the UAE has created a 
diverse work environment in all sectors.  A comparison between nationals and expatriates 
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in the capital city of Abu Dhabi is provided in Table 1.  As of 2005, UAE nationals 
represented a mere 10.5% of the work force (Statistics Centre, 2011). 
 
 
Table 1  
 
Labor Force by Nationality 
 
 
Indicator    1985   1995     2001    2005 
Labor Force 297,406 532,881 676,547 815,311 
Nationals 22,358 43,183 71,651 85,838 
Expatriates 275,048 489,698 604,896 729,473 
Note: Adapted from “Statistical Yearbook of Abu Dhabi 2011,” by Statistics Centre - 
Abu Dhabi, 2011. 
 
 
According to Qabbani and Shaheen (2011), the unemployment rate among UAE 
nationals reached 12.9% in 2011.  A comparison across employment sectors revealed that 
UAE nationals are the least present in the transport sector, as illustrated in Figure 2.  A 
6.5% rate of nationals’ employment indicates that the transport sector is dominated by a 
highly diverse group of expatriates (Al-Romaithi, 2006).   
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Figure 2. National employment by sector. Adapted from “Emiratization Efforts in the 
UAE: Impediments to a Serious Vision,” by National Bank of Dubai, 2005. Copyright 
2005 by National Bank of Dubai. 
 
 
Pilot Shortage in the UAE 
 Airlines in the UAE have transformed the country into a global nexus and an 
integral hub for international operations (Vespermann et al., 2008).  However, due to the 
shortage of national pilots, carriers in the UAE have been relying on foreign pilots.  
According to Captain Khaled Al Ali, Director of Licensing at the GCAA, the total 
number of registered pilots in the UAE was 9,480 in 2012; 700 of these pilots were UAE 
nationals (A. Khaled, personal communication, October 21, 2012).   
National pilots and aircraft ground engineers at Emirates Airlines represent 
approximately 12% of the airline’s total work force (International UAE, 2011).  
Furthermore, airline operators in the UAE are expanding rapidly and pilot training 
programs in the region are not providing airlines with the required number of qualified 
national pilots (Carbary, 2011).  In order to meet its large order of 144 aircraft, Emirates 
Airlines planned to hire more than 700 pilots from several countries beginning in 2010 
and extending for 18 months (Sambidge, 2010).  By 2020, the number of pilots in the 
UAE is expected to increase by 75% (Glass, 2008). 
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 The pilot shortage is not unique to the UAE.  Boeing estimates 436,500 new pilots 
will be required by 2029 worldwide (Arnold, 2011).  This situation may lead to a 
worldwide pilot shortage raising safety concerns among industry officials (Lowy, 2012).  
The high demand for pilots may jeopardize the ability to meet qualification standards.  As 
John Allen, the Federal Aviation Administration’s Director of Flight Services, stated, “if 
there is a shortage, airlines will hire pilots who are technically qualified but do not have 
the ‘right stuff’” (Lowy, 2012, para. 11).  
Commercial Aviation Safety 
 According to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) (2006), safety 
is defined as “the state in which the risk of harm to persons or of property damage is 
reduced to, and maintained at or below, an acceptable level through a continuing process 
of hazard identification and risk management” (p. 1-1).  Aviation is a complex system 
that involves mechanical, human, and technological components that formulate the 
principal framework for operational integrity (Wells, 2001).  In order to ensure optimum 
safety levels, safety programs must be developed to aid in identifying the hazards and 
risks that result in accidents and incidents.  One particular area of interest is the realm of 
pilot error.    
Pilot Error. Despite advancements in airline operations and training, 70% of 
worldwide aircraft accidents and incidents are attributed to pilot error (Kanki, Helmreich, 
& Anca, 2010).  In order to mitigate the rate of pilot error, numerous training programs, 
such as CRM, have been developed and infused into daily airline operations (Helmreich, 
2000a).  However, studies such as Helmreich (2000a) have indicated that more than 50% 
of pilot errors were classified as intentional non-compliance.   
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The number of intentional non-compliance errors is alarming, making it 
imperative to identify and evaluate the driving factors behind these pilot behaviors and 
attitudes, as illustrated in Figure 3.  Due to the differences in norms and beliefs among 
pilots, national cultural variation is of particular concern as operational standards may be 
influenced. 
 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of error types. Adapted from “Culture and Error in Space: 
Implications from Analog Environments,” by R. L. Helmreich, 2000a, Aviation, Space, 
and Environmental Medicine, 79(9-11), 133-139. Copyright 2000 by the University of 
Texas at Austin. 
 
 
 
The Middle East and North African Region (MENA)  
The International Air Transport Association (IATA) has categorized aircraft 
accidents and incidents into various phases of flight.  According to an IATA (2012) 
safety report for the MENA region, a total of 92 aircraft accidents occurred in 2011, 46 of 
which occurred during the landing phase.  Judging by the high number of landing events 
compared to the other categories in Figure 4, landing can be viewed as the most critical 
phase of flight. 
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Figure 4. Accidents per phase of flight. Adapted from “Safety Report 2011,” by 
International Air Transport Association, 2012. 
  
Among commercial international carriers, accidents that occurred in 2011 have 
been classified into different categories, such as runway excursion, hard landing, and tail 
strike as depicted in Figure 5.  Gear-up landing / gear collapse (18%) and runway 
excursions (19%) contributed the highest percentage of occurrences in 2011 in the 
MENA region (IATA, 2012).  The MENA region experienced higher rates of accidents in 
these two categories than other regions, as illustrated in Figures 6 and 7.  Flight crew 
errors involved in the aforementioned accidents include lack of adherence to SOP, poor 
decision-making processes, and poor flying skills (IATA, 2012).   
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Figure 5. Categories of accidents in 2011. Adapted from “Safety Report 2011,” by 
International Air Transport Association, 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Rate1 of gear-up / gear collapse by region. Adapted from “Safety Report 2011,” 
by International Air Transport Association, 2012. 
                                                 
1 Accidents per million sectors flown 
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Figure 7. Rate2 of runway excursion by region. Adapted from “Safety Report 2011,” by 
International Air Transport Association, 2012. 
 
 
In 2009, the number of accidents among commercial carriers in the MENA region 
decreased by 17% compared to previous years, though the MENA region experienced 
significantly higher rates of hard landings and tail strikes compared to other regions as 
depicted in Figures 8 and 9 (IATA, 2010).  Contributing factors that led to these incidents 
included failure to execute a go-around after destabilization during the final approach 
phase and poor automation skills (IATA, 2010).   
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Accidents per million sectors flown 
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Figure 8. Rate2 of hard landings by region. Adapted from “Safety Report 2009,” by 
International Air Transport Association, 2010. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Rate3of tail strikes by region. Adapted from “Safety Report 2009,” by 
International Air Transport Association, 2010. 
 
 
The rates from Figures 8 and 9 are important as they link contributing factors with 
operational deficiencies present among pilots.  These rates are associated with operational 
deficiencies due to pilots’ poor automation skills and incorrect operational procedures 
during destabilized approaches (IATA, 2010).  This linkage requires a deep 
understanding of operational requirements and mitigating actions that are developed 
through systematic and procedural approaches in standardization processes.  Although 
the events that have occurred in the MENA region involved aircraft registered in the 
MENA region, pilots with different nationalities operated these aircraft.  Thus, cross-
cultural influences may have played a role in the aforementioned events. 
Selected Airline 
                                                 
3 Accidents per million sectors flown 
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 Due to the sensitivity of the data gathered and in order to protect the identity of 
the airline that provided the data, this study will refer to the selected airline as Air 
MENA.  Since its inaugural flight, Air MENA has developed into a globally recognized 
airline serving 86 international destinations utilizing a highly advanced mixed fleet of 
Airbus and Boeing aircraft (Corporate Communications, 2012).  The work force at Air 
Mena is comprised of 10,000 multi-national skilled employees (Corporate 
Communications, 2012). 
Significance of the Study 
 Airline operations in the Middle East, and particularly in the UAE, are constantly 
expanding.  According to ICAO (2013), airports in the UAE handled 212,074 departures 
for three local carriers in 2010.  Since the employment rate of UAE nationals in the 
aviation sector is noticeably low, carriers are highly dependent on expatriate pilots.  As a 
result, while interacting with crewmembers from various cultures, flight deck crew may 
not perform to their full potential during critical phases of the flight due to differences in 
attitudes and beliefs (Moran, Harris, & Moran, 2011).  George’s (2010) study has 
revealed that human error contributes to more than half of the incidents and accidents 
experienced by airline operators.  By analyzing the cultural differences present among 
airline pilots and the impact of these differences on operational safety, this dissertation 
aims to determine the need for a Cross-Cultural Awareness and Action Program 
(CCAAP) that would improve pilot safety performance. 
Statement of the Problem 
Airlines registered in the MENA region account for the highest ratio of accidents 
when compared to other regions.  The low number of qualified national pilots in the 
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Middle East compels airlines registered in the MENA region to rely on cross-cultural 
flight crews.  This reliance creates a vast cross-cultural environment on the flight deck of 
Middle Eastern airlines.  Hiring pilots from various cultural backgrounds introduces 
various attitudes, behaviors, and beliefs into the organization that could inadvertently 
jeopardize operational safety and may result in flight deck mismanagement.  
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this dissertation is to determine if cross-cultural flight deck crew 
composition is related to increased error levels.  Data from an airline in the UAE was 
utilized to analyze the influence of cross-cultural pilots on operational safety.  
The airline industry is highly diversified, extremely safety-sensitive, and 
technologically driven.  Due to the complexities of air transportation, airlines have 
implemented fundamental training programs to attain and maintain safe operations 
including CRM, threat and error management (TEM), and SOP (Salas, Bowers, & Edens, 
2001).  Continuous improvements to these programs have been made as the industry 
strives to improve the safety of air travel.  In order to understand the influence of cross-
cultural crew environment on pilot performance, it is crucial to study these programs and 
explore their impact on daily operations (Salas, Bowers, & Edens, 2001). 
Research Questions 
 One research question will be addressed in this study to identify possible 
relationships between cross-cultural crews and safety performance.  The research 
question focuses on three flight events: Hard Landings, Unstable Approaches, and Pilot 
Deviations during various flight phases. 
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 To what extent can we predict an unsafe performance event based on the 
nationality combination of pilots? 
Hypotheses 
 This dissertation aims to analyze six null hypotheses.  Three hypotheses compare 
cross-cultural and homogeneous flight deck crews in terms of safety performance with 
regard to Hard Landings, Unstable Approaches, and Pilot Deviations during various 
flight phases.  Three other hypotheses assess the influence of intervening demographic 
variables on the association between nationality combinations and unsafe performance 
events. 
1. There was no significant effect of the covariate age on the relationship 
between nationality combinations of captains / first officers and unsafe 
performance events.   
2. There was no significant effect of the covariate airport destination on the 
relationship between nationality combinations of captains / first officers and 
unsafe performance events. 
3. There was no significant effect of the covariate eligibility to command the 
flight on the relationship between nationality combinations of captains / first 
officers and unsafe performance events. 
4. There was no significant association between the frequency of homogeneous 
and heterogeneous cross-cultural nationality combinations of captains / first 
officers on unsafe performance events. 
5. There was no significant association between the frequency of the nationality 
combinations of captains / first officers on unsafe performance events. 
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6. There was no significant association between cross-cultural (pilot nationality) 
group memberships on unsafe performance events. 
Limitations 
  This dissertation analyzed a data set obtained from an airline in the UAE.  The 
data provided are factual and objective, and the data do not explain why something 
happened, just that it did.  These data were captured by the flight data monitoring system 
due to exceedances in preset operational limitations.  Due to the sensitivity of the data 
gathered from the selected airline, the data was thoroughly de-identified and treated as 
proprietary.  No information was revealed that would jeopardize the identity of the airline 
and pilots involved with the study.  Data that specifically identify individuals or the 
airline have been omitted; these data include, but are not limited to, aircraft registration, 
staff numbers, and pilot names.  
Delimitations and Assumptions 
It was assumed that pilots operate at or above the minimum proficiency levels as 
mandated by the civil aviation authorities.  As such, it was assumed that pilots employed 
by other airlines in the region attain the same minimum proficiency levels by undergoing 
similar training programs. 
Despite the large number of airlines in the MENA region, data was retrieved from 
only one airline.  However, the shortage of pilots was common among carriers in this 
region.  These carriers depended on expatriate pilots for their recruitment processes.  
Hence, it was assumed that other airlines in the region had a similar cross-cultural 
environment.   
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Flight events involved in the gathered data are assumed to be normal flights 
without any instructors, examiners, or evaluators who may have influenced pilots’ 
performances.  Also, pilots with dual national heritage (Chinese-American) were 
included in only a single nationality category.  These pilots were assumed to have 
behaved according to their primary national culture as defined by Helmreich (1999).  For 
example, a Chinese-American would be considered an American. 
Definitions of Terms 
AQP  Advanced Qualification Program.  A new training initiative that 
allows airlines to develop tailored training curriculums aimed at 
improving training and flight safety (Federal Aviation 
Administration [FAA], 2006a). 
ASR  Air Safety Report.  Safety reports used by pilots to file operational 
deviations under normal and abnormal flight conditions 
(Operations Manual Part A, 2012a, Chapter 11.6.2.). 
CRM  Crew Resource Management.  “The effective use of all available 
resources: human resources, hardware, and information” (FAA, 
2004a, p. 2). 
Cross-Culture  A flight deck crew composed of a captain and first officer from at 
least two different cultural backgrounds (Helmreich, 2000a). 
Culture “Shared values (what is important) and beliefs (how things work) 
that interact with an organization’s structure and control systems to 
produce behavioral norms (the way we do things around here)” 
(Reason, 1998, p. 294). 
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Error  “An action or inaction that leads to a deviation from crew or 
organizational intentions or expectations” (Klinect, Wilhelm, & 
Helmreich, 1999, p. 3). 
FOQA  Flight Operational Quality Assurance.  A safety program that 
enables airlines to routinely collect flight data for analysis 
purposes.  This program can help airlines reduce potential risks 
and minimize pilot errors (FAA, 2013). 
Hazard  “Any existing or potential condition that can lead to injury, illness, 
or death; damage to or loss of a system, equipment, or property; or 
damage to the environment.  A hazard is a condition that might 
cause an accident or incident” (FAA, 2010, Appendix 1, p. 6).  
Individualism versus Collectivism     A cultural dimension that refers to two types 
of societies: an individualistic society where individuals are 
concerned with their own interests and collectivistic society where 
individuals are concerned with the interests of others over self 
interests (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010).  
Masculinity versus Femininity     A cultural dimension that refers to two types of 
societies: a masculine society where individuals are more assertive, 
competitive, and reward-oriented, and a feminine society where 
individuals are more modest, caring, and cooperative (Strauch, 
2010). 
National Culture     Attitudes, behaviors, and values based on heritage 
(Helmreich, 1999). 
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Risk  “The composite of predicted severity (how bad) and likelihood 
(how probable) of the potential effect of a hazard in its worst 
credible (reasonable or believable) system state” (FAA, 2010, 
Appendix 1, p. 8). 
Organizational Culture     Attitudes, behaviors, and values that are influenced by 
different organizational groups (Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008).  
Pilot Deviations     Actions or inactions by pilots that deviate from airline 
procedures and regulations (FAA, 2009). 
Power Distance     A cultural dimension that measures hierarchal degrees in 
societies.  Inequality between senior and junior crewmembers may 
be viewed differently in various societies; thus, attitudes and 
behaviors are influenced accordingly (Hofstede et al., 2010). 
Professional Culture     Attitudes, behaviors, and values that are influenced by 
professions (Stolzer et al., 2008). 
SHELL Software-Hardware-Environment-Liveware-Liveware.  Is a model 
that describes the operational relation between five human factors - 
related links: software, hardware, environment, liveware, and 
liveware (Stolzer et al., 2008). 
Threats “Events or errors that occur beyond the influence of the flight 
crew, increase operational complexity, and which must be 
managed to maintain margins of safety” (Bradley, 2010, p. 4). 
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Violation “Deliberate - but not necessarily reprehensible - deviations from 
those practices deemed necessary to maintain the safe operation of 
a potentially hazardous system” (Reason, 2009, p. 195). 
Uncertainty Avoidance     A cultural dimension that measures the degree of 
discomfort among individuals with regards to uncertainty and 
ambiguity (Strauch, 2010).  
List of Acronyms 
AAL  Above Aerodrome Level 
AES Arrival / Engine Shutdown 
AIMS Airline Information Management System 
AQP Advanced Qualification Program 
APR Approach 
ASR Air Safety Report 
ATC Air Traffic Control 
C3RM Cross-Cultural Crew Resource Management 
CAP Cultural Action Program 
CAT Cultural Awareness Training 
CCAAP Cross-Cultural Awareness and Action Program 
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States 
CMAQ Cockpit Management Attitudes Questionnaire 
CRM Crew Resource Management 
CRP Culture Re-Qualification Program 
CRZ  Cruise 
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DST  Descent 
DV  Dependent Variable 
ECL En Route Climb 
EFQM European Foundation for Quality Management 
ESD Engine Start / Depart 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FDM Flight Data Monitoring 
FLC Flight Close 
FLP Flight Planning 
FMAQ Flight Management Attitude Questionnaire 
FMASS Flight Management Attitudes and Safety Survey 
FOQA Flight Operational Quality Assurance 
G Gravity 
GCAA General Civil Aviation Authority 
GDS Ground Servicing 
GOA Go-Around 
GSM Global System for Mobile 
IATA International Airport Transport Association 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 
ICE Integrated Culture Evaluation 
ICL Initial Climb 
IDV Individualism versus Collectivism 
IPO Input-Process-Output 
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IV  Independent Variable 
JAR Joint Aviation Requirements 
LND Landing 
MENA Middle East and North Africa 
MAS Masculinity versus Femininity 
NBD National Bank of Dubai 
NDB Non-Directional Beacon 
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board 
PD Power Distance 
PRF Pre-Flight 
PSF Post-Flight 
RTO Rejected Take-Off 
SHELL Software-Hardware-Environment-Liveware-Liveware 
SMM Safety Management Manual 
SMS Safety Management System 
SOP Standard Operating Procedures 
SPSS Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
TEM Threat and Error Management 
TOF Take-Off 
TXI Taxi-In 
TXO Taxi-Out 
UAE United Arab Emirates 
UAI Uncertainty Avoidance Index 
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UN United Nations 
VLS Lowest Selectable Speed 
VREF Landing Reference Speed 
VOR Very-High-Frequency Omni-Range Navigation Equipment  
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE 
A genuine cross-cultural experience is ubiquitous in the daily operations of most 
organizations (Solomon & Schell, 2009).  To achieve required operational standards in 
any organization, the organization must become culturally adept by understanding the 
different values, beliefs, and behaviors expressed by cross-cultural work forces (Solomon 
& Schell, 2009).   
Human Factors in Aviation 
Aviation pioneers have focused on enhancing aircraft technologies and aircraft 
design to increase operational safety and improve pilot efficiency (Roscoe, 1980).  From 
World War I until the present day, the air transportation system has experienced 
remarkable changes that have resulted in operational improvements (Brady, 2000).  The 
proliferation of new computerized aircraft systems has increased safety levels by 
reducing pilots’ workload through the introduction of advanced flight instruments (Tsang 
& Vidulich, 2003).  Moreover, safety levels have continued to improve as a result of 
enhanced aviation regulations in such areas as pilot training, licensing, and aircraft 
maintenance programs (Wells & Rodrigues, 2004). 
Undoubtedly, the use of technological improvements has revolutionized air 
transportation by reducing accident rates and providing operational flexibility for pilots.  
Nevertheless, new types of accidents and incidents have emerged that have raised safety 
concerns with regard to pilot performance (Tsang & Vidulich, 2003).  To gain a better 
understanding of various operational deficiencies, Tsang and Vidulich (2003) conducted 
several studies on pilots’ interactions and behaviors.  One of their studies revealed that 
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accidents and incidents were a result of errors due to “interpersonal rather than technical 
deficiencies” (Tsang & Vidulich, 2003, p. 477).  In order to mitigate these errors, a 
training program, known as CRM, has been implemented by airlines. 
CRM: Improving Pilot Performance 
In an effort to reduce pilot error and improve overall performance on the flight 
deck, a new training program was designed in 1980 to enable pilots to effectively utilize 
their resources (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999).  As defined in Advisory Circular 
120-51E, CRM is “the effective use of all available resources: human resources, 
hardware, and information” (FAA, 2004a, p. 2).  To achieve efficiency and effectiveness 
from CRM training, operators incorporate comprehensive SOP in a teamwork-based 
curriculum (FAA, 2004a).  Special emphasis is placed on skills and behaviors that enable 
crewmembers to be effective team members (FAA, 2004a). 
Evolution of CRM 
In the early 1980s, CRM training was focused on the negative behavior of 
subordinate crewmembers and encouraged captains to perform with a team-oriented 
attitude rather than with a dictatorial managerial style (Tsang & Vidulich, 2003).  Certain 
interpersonal behaviors between pilots that promoted teamwork and cooperation were 
reinforced through class exercises (Merritt & Helmreich, 1997).  Results from extensive 
studies provided impetus to the airlines’ training departments to review and evaluate their 
current training curricula (Merritt & Helmreich, 1997).  As a result, CRM became an 
integral part of pilot training in the classroom and simulator (Kanki et al., 2010). 
 
  
25 
Second Generation CRM - 1986 
Airline focus on CRM led to further developments in pilot training.  Additional 
training elements, such as team building, situational awareness, and stress management 
strengthened the CRM program.  The notion of synergy and teamwork ideologies was 
further reinforced by changing the name from cockpit resource management to crew 
resource management (Helmreich et al., 1999).  However, training exercises at the time 
did not relate specifically to aviation activities, which may have negatively influenced the 
pilots’ acceptance of the program (Kanki et al., 2010). 
Third Generation CRM - 1993 
 A new CRM concept emerged that allowed further improvements in pilot 
performance.  Aviation-related factors, such as organizational culture and human factors, 
were infused into the third generation of the training program (Helmreich et al., 1999).  
Moreover, CRM training was extended to check airmen, cabin crew, maintenance 
personnel, and dispatchers (Kanki et al., 2010).  However, further developments in CRM 
were required to understand the factors behind human errors. 
Fourth Generation CRM - 1994 
 Major changes were introduced to the fourth generation that allowed airlines to 
develop individualized training programs known as an Advanced Qualification Programs 
(AQP) (FAA, 2006a).  Inclusion of AQP in an airline’s training program provides a 
proficiency-based curriculum that targets pilot error (Tsang & Vidulich, 2003). 
 AQP.  The FAA has developed a new training initiative that aims at improving 
airlines’ training programs by allowing each individual airline to develop tailored 
curricula (FAA, 2006a).  These curricula are based upon the proficiency levels of each 
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airline’s pilots rather than mere compliance with required flight and ground training 
hours (FAA, 2006a).  Through the implementation of an AQP, airlines are capable of 
improving proficiency levels through continuous evaluation of crew performance (FAA, 
2006a).  Seven characteristics distinguish AQP from other safety programs (Farrow, 
2006): 
1. Implementation of an AQP is voluntary; 
2. An AQP requires utilization of innovative and evaluative methodologies; 
3. An AQP may be integrated with an existing training program; 
4. Qualification criteria will be based upon individual and team performance; 
5.  Data collection and analysis will be used to validate proficiency levels; 
6. Training will be developed according to training requirements; and 
7. An AQP will involve continuous development and maintenance to meet 
training requirements. 
CRM: Transition to the Flight Deck.  CRM training programs have undergone 
extensive changes as they have matured in various airlines’ training programs.  Pilots’ 
behaviors and attitudes have evolved as well (Helmreich, Chidester, Foushee, Gregorich, 
& Wilhelm, 1990).  However, the potential of CRM has not been fully realized.  Certain 
pilots have continued to exhibit nonconformist attitudes toward the new training 
curricula.  The pilots’ acceptance of changes and new training programs is highly 
important when seeking improvements in safety levels.  Because of the cultural 
differences found in international airlines, these airlines have considered national culture 
training into their CRM programs to stress the importance of cultural harmony within 
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their organization (Helmreich et al., 1999).  International airlines with major cultural 
variations recognize the importance of cross-cultural training programs (Mjøs, 2004). 
Input - Process - Outcome (IPO) Model.  An input-process-outcome (IPO) 
model delineates the effectiveness of teamwork among crewmembers by providing a list 
of factors influencing crew performance at various stages (Tsang & Vidulich, 2003).  
These factors reflect crewmembers’ characteristics as they are influenced by a set of 
attitudes, competencies, and skills (Salas, Wilson, Burke, & Burke, 2006).  Since 
crewmembers’ performance is group-based, their success depends on team coordination 
and overall standardization among members.  Figure 10 provides a general model of 
inputs, processes, and outcomes upon which operational safety is dependent.  The authors 
noted that factors such as pilots’ professional culture, communication, and individual 
attitudes, are interlinked and affect overall safety levels (Kanki et al., 2010). 
 
 
Figure 10. IPO Model. Adapted from “Crew Resource Management,” by B. G. Kanki, 
R. L. Helmreich, & J. Anca, 2010. Copyright 2010 by Elsevier Inc. 
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 Input Factors.  The input segment is categorized into seven main components 
that reflect crewmembers’ attitudes and behaviors based upon group interactions.  These 
attitudes and behaviors may impact crewmembers’ performance (Kanki et al., 2010): 
1. Individual aptitudes: refers to the proficiency levels of crewmembers.  Pilots 
and cabin crew must demonstrate certain levels of proficiency to meet airline 
and authority requirements.   
2. Physical condition: refers to the physical and health status of crewmembers.  
Crewmembers must undergo rigid annual medical checks. 
3. Crew composition: refers to the total number of crewmembers and their 
gender distribution.  All flights require a minimum number of crewmembers; 
this number varies depending on the length of the flight.  For example, flights 
exceeding 14 hours require four pilots (Operations Manual Part A, 2012e). 
4. Organizational: refers to the policies that control operational variables, such as 
management-worker relations.  
5. Regulatory: refers to the rules and operational limitations that formulate the 
regulatory influences in an organization.  Regulatory examples include 
maximum duty hours and minimum crew compositions. 
6. Cultural: refers to the quality of interaction between crewmembers that can be 
influenced by cross-culture as a result of variations in attitudes and behaviors. 
7. Environmental: refers to the surrounding factors such as organizational, 
regulatory, and cultural influences to create a work environment deemed 
necessary for operational requirements. 
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Since these seven components are considered internal and external factors, they 
define multi-dimensional characteristics that have a pervasive effect on crewmembers’ 
performance.  Each component forms an important operational layer that conceptualizes 
crew proficiency levels and determines operational safety (Kanki et al., 2010). 
 Process Factors.  During the process stage, crewmembers integrate their 
knowledge and skills to perform their duties according to predetermined standards.  
During this stage, many of the tasks performed are considered non-technical skills and 
include factors such as communications, decision-making process, workload 
management, teamwork, and situational awareness (Tsang & Vidulich, 2003).  Though 
highly dependent on input factors, the process factors form the fundamentals required by 
crewmembers to achieve safe operations.  Effective teamwork and cooperative skills 
form the foundation of process factors.  Thus, the awareness of cultural differences 
among pilots on the flight deck is vital for effective usage of non-technical skills.  There 
are six components involved in the process stage (Kanki et al., 2010): 
1. Crew formation and management: refers to how workload is divided among 
crewmembers in a manageable and resourceful manner. 
2. Aircraft flight control: refers to aircraft components, such as ailerons and 
elevators, which receive inputs from the pilots to perform certain tasks.   
3. Communication skills: refers to the interaction between pilots and air traffic 
control, between captain and first officer, and between pilots and cabin crew. 
4. Decision processes: refers to decisions and actions taken by crewmembers 
during normal or abnormal flight situations. 
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5. Situational awareness: refers to the crewmembers’ ability to recognize and act 
upon operational requirements.  
6. Operating procedures: refers to the standard procedures set forth by the 
airline.  These procedures must ensure certain operational requirements. 
 Outcomes.  Due to technical advancements in the commercial aviation sector, 
accident rates are already low, making it difficult to use accident rates as measures of 
effective outcomes.  In order to achieve optimal outcomes, airlines must maintain, 
monitor, and promote safe operations through a hazard identification and risk assessment 
process.  This process has been integrated with safety programs, such as FOQA, and is 
fundamental to the development of a safety management system (SMS) (Stolzer et al., 
2008). 
Fifth Generation CRM: Error Management - 1996 
 The underpinning notion of the fifth generation of CRM is that human error is 
inevitable and the consequences of these human errors can only be minimized 
(McCartney, 2005).  Avoiding, trapping, or mitigating errors form the foundations of fifth 
generation CRM (Kanki et al., 2010).  Error identification lies deep within an 
organization’s IPO model.  CRM provides an error management methodology that adopts 
a non-punitive approach to aid in identifying the nature and source of errors (Helmreich 
et al., 1999).  Over time, CRM has been defined by the following characteristics; CRM: 
1. Inculcates a comprehensive system of applying human factors concepts to 
improve crew performance; 
2. Embraces all operational personnel; 
3. Blends into all forms of aircrew training; 
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4. Concentrates on crewmembers’ attitudes, behaviors, and impact on safety; 
5. Uses the crew as the unit of training; 
6. Requires the active participation of all crewmembers; and   
7. Provides an opportunity for individuals and crews to examine their own 
behavior, and to make decisions on how to improve flight deck teamwork 
(FAA, 2004a, p. 6). 
Sixth Generation: TEM - 2001 
  As CRM evolved through five generations, it became apparent to researchers and 
airline operators that identifying errors alone is not sufficient for a successful CRM 
program (Kanki et al., 2010).  Recognizing and assessing threats became valuable 
components of CRM, which enhanced situational awareness and decision-making skills 
among crewmembers (Kanki et al., 2010). 
 Error versus Violation.  Prior to adopting a non-punitive environment, an 
organization must clearly define and distinguish between error and violation.  Error is 
defined as “an action or inaction that leads to a deviation from crew or organizational 
intentions or expectations” (Klinect et al., 1999, p. 3).  Error can appear in three different 
forms: (a) initial and impromptu, (b) threat-related, and (c) as a component of the chain 
of errors (Klinect, 2005).   
 Violation is defined as “deliberate - but not necessarily reprehensible - deviations 
from those practices deemed necessary to maintain the safe operation of a potentially 
hazardous system” (Reason, 2009, p. 195).  Reason (2009) classified violations as 
follows:  
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1. Routine Violations: Following a path with the least amount of effort provides 
convenience although it does not abide by the operator’s requirements and SOPs.  
Designing simplified systems and procedures can eliminate these violations. 
2. Exceptional Violations: In some circumstances, violations are inevitable due to 
present conditions.  This type of violation is known as system double-binds and is 
highly dependent on surrounding conditions (Reason, 2009).  For example, a crew 
may elect to commit a violation in order to rectify a particular situation despite the 
level of risks it may present.  
  Hazard.  The FAA defines hazard as “any existing or potential condition that can 
lead to injury, illness, or death; damage to or loss of a system, equipment, or property; or 
damage to the environment.  A hazard is a condition that might cause an accident or 
incident” (FAA, 2010, Appendix 1, p. 6).  Examples of common hazards are pilot fatigue 
and improper use of checklists. 
 Various models aid in understanding and analyzing hazards.  One of these models 
is the Software-Hardware-Environment-Liveware-Liveware (SHELL) model as depicted 
in Figure 11.  This model provides systematic data pertaining to operations from a human 
factor perspective and encompasses the following elements: software, hardware, 
environment, liveware, and liveware (Stolzer et al., 2008).  These elements are comprised 
of human factor interventions that identify various interactions occurring on the flight 
deck (Wise, Hopkin, & Garland, 2010).   
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Figure 11. The SHELL model. Adapted from “Safety Management Systems in Aviation,” 
by A. J. Stolzer, C. D. Halford, & J. J. Goglia, 2008. Copyright 2008 by Ashgate 
Publishing Company. 
 
 
 
 The model can be viewed as a relationship between the liveware, crewmembers, 
and every other element in the model.  The four crucial relationships are described as 
follows (Stolzer et al., 2008): 
1. Liveware and software: refers to the interaction between crewmembers and non-
physical system components such as procedures, checklists, and manuals.  
2. Liveware and hardware: refers to the relationship between crewmembers and all 
components of an aircraft such as the navigation instruments, yoke, and throttle 
controls. 
3. Liveware and environment: refers to the relationship between crewmembers and 
the environmental factors that could affect crew performance such as oxygen 
requirements at higher altitudes and radiation levels. 
  
34 
4. Liveware and liveware: refers to the interaction between crewmembers and other 
individuals directly related to operational requirements such as cabin 
crewmembers, air traffic controllers, and ground engineers (Stolzer et al., 2008). 
 Risk.  According to the FAA, risk is defined as “the composite of predicted 
severity (how bad) and likelihood (how probable) of the potential effect of a hazard in its 
worst credible (reasonable or believable) system state” (FAA, 2010, Appendix 1, p. 8).  A 
pilot who continues flying the final approach despite the large cumulonimbus cell ahead 
faces a number of risks such as aircraft stall, poor aircraft performance, or possibly a 
crash. 
   Since human error is a leading factor for operational risk, exploring the sources of 
risks are vital for future safe operations.  Threats and errors have been viewed as the main 
sources of risks in daily operations.  The accumulation of threats and errors may lead to 
irreversible and undesirable outcomes.  Figure 12 is a graphic illustration of the Swiss 
cheese model.  Each cheese layer represents safeguards and defenses against 
organizational weaknesses and risks that are represented by holes in each layer (Reason, 
1997).  As the number of weaknesses and risks increases, the chance of an accident or 
incident becomes higher. 
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Figure 12. The Swiss cheese model. Adapted from “Managing the Risk of 
 Organizational Accidents,” by J. Reason, 1997. Copyright 1997 by Ashgate Publishing 
Company. 
 
 
Although the Swiss cheese model has been widely used in professional training 
programs, its depiction of organizations and human interactions limits the model’s use.  
The model does not address the complex relationship between latent conditions and 
active failures, which confines its graphical description to a linear fashion (Dekker, 
2006b).  The simplicity behind the model’s graphical illustration fails to explain the chain 
of events that may have led to weakness in safety levels and eventually mishaps 
(Hollnagel & Woods, 2006). 
Threats.  Daily airline operations are faced with numerous threats that are defined 
as “events or errors that occur beyond the influence of the flight crew, increase 
operational complexity, and which must be managed to maintain margins of safety” 
(Bradley, 2010, p. 4).  Early identification of threats can prevent breakdowns of 
safeguards and defenses.  The two main types of threats are:      
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1. Internal Threats:  Elements that occur on the flight deck and are directly 
related to pilots’ behaviors and attitudes are considered internal threats.  
Examples of internal threats include lack of rest, fatigue/stress due to work 
overload, poor communication, or lack of cooperation between pilots due to 
cultural variations (Klinect, 2005). 
2. External Threats:  Elements that occur outside the flight deck environment, 
such as meteorological conditions, high terrain, air traffic control congestion, 
or engine failure are considered external threats (Klinect, 2005).  External 
threats pose the highest level of operational risks during the most critical flight 
phases: takeoff and landing (Klinect et al., 1999). 
Errors.  An increase in the number of internal and/or external threats results in a 
higher risk of pilot error.  James (2011) divides these errors into four categories: 
1. Operational Decision Errors:  This type of error is highly dependent on the 
decision-making, situational awareness, and workload capabilities of the pilots.  
For example, failure to perform a go-around during a destabilized approach is a 
serious error that could lead to irreversible consequences. 
2. Communication Errors:  Misinterpretation or omission of air traffic control 
calls may lead to the risk of undesirable altitude deviations and possibly a 
TCAS event.  Also, communication errors between pilots, between pilots and 
cabin crew, and between pilots and ground staff may lead to incidents and 
accidents. 
3. Procedural Errors:  Performing SOP incorrectly during any phase of the flight 
may result in accidents or incidents. 
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4. Handling Errors: Undesired aircraft state caused by low proficiency levels and 
weak situational awareness. 
 TEM can be accomplished through an understanding of sequential threats and 
errors leading to operational deficiencies (Thomas, 2004).  In order to identify these 
deficiencies, it is important for the leaders of organizations to understand the hazards, 
risks, and consequences these deficiencies pose to daily operations.  Airline operations 
present a wide array of hazards and risks that could jeopardize operational safety.    
 Managing threats and errors is a critical process that involves a combination of 
experience and rigorous training (James, 2011).  Once threats have been identified, pilots 
must perform proficiently to avoid errors.  Avoiding error can be accomplished through 
strict adherence to SOP, the use of effective communication between crewmembers, 
adhering to an effective decision-making process, and maintaining high proficiency 
levels.  If errors have been committed, they must be trapped before multiple errors 
accumulate and lead to consequential events (James, 2011).  Trapping errors can be 
accomplished by continuous crosschecking and monitoring of aircraft systems, weather, 
and other related factors, such as communication.  If errors have penetrated through the 
safeguards and system defenses, then the errors can be mitigated by changing the course 
of action, for example, executing a go-around or diverting to an alternative airport 
(James, 2011).   
 According to a study conducted by the University of Texas at Austin, threats and 
errors are more likely to occur during descent / approach / landing phases due to the high 
workload experienced by the pilots (Klinect et al., 1999).  Table 2 provides the likelihood 
of threat and error occurrences per flight phase.   
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Table 2   
 
Threat and Error in Various Flight Phases 
 
 
Flight Phase Threats Errors 
Pre-departure / Taxi 30% 25% 
Takeoff / Climb 22% 22% 
Cruise 10% 10% 
Descent / Approach / Landing 36% 40% 
Taxi / Park 2% 3% 
Note. Adapted from “System Safety and Threat and Error Management: Line Operational 
Safety Audit (LOSA), “by R. L. Helmreich, J. Klinect, & J. Wilhelm. Copyright 2001a 
by the 12th Annual Symposium on Aviation Psychology in Columbus, Ohio. 
 
 
As shown, more threats and errors occurred during the descent / approach / 
landing phases with a likelihood occurrence of 36% for threats and 40% for errors.  
Alternatively, the cruise and taxi / park phases of operations accounted for the lowest 
percentage of threats and errors. 
Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) 
According to Air MENA’s operating manual, the commander is responsible for 
accomplishing a number of operational tasks that would ensure high levels of safety 
(Operations Manual Part A, 2012c).  These responsibilities include adherence to SOPs, 
which involve limitations and parameters pertaining to the operation of an aircraft.  
Examples of operational limitations include: aircraft takeoff/landing weights, stabilized 
approach criteria, and aircraft attitude/speed.    
With the aid of advanced aircraft data monitoring and recording systems, flights 
are continuously monitored.  The continuous monitoring allows for the tracking of all 
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aircraft systems in which an exceedance was detected during the course of the flight.  
These technologies have improved aviation safety by evolving the flight investigation 
techniques from a reactive approach to proactive and predictive approaches (Stolzer et 
al., 2008).  These approaches form the basis of a safety program known as FOQA.  
According to ICAO, “FOQA is a proactive and non-punitive programme for gathering 
and analyzing data recorded during routine flights to improve flight crew performance, 
operating procedures, flight training, air traffic control procedures, air navigation 
services, or aircraft maintenance and design ” (ICAO, 2006, p. 16-3).  Although FOQA is 
a voluntary safety program for U.S. based airlines, once an airline decides to implement 
it, then the program is not voluntary for pilots (FAA, 2004b).  In contrast, ICAO Annex 6 
requires all airlines to implement FOQA programs (ICAO, 2006).  
 FOQA offers an objective approach toward flight data collection and analysis set 
forth by each airline known as Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) (Stolzer et al., 2008).  
Airlines develop policies, processes, and procedures upon which their daily operations 
are based.  FDM systems are utilized to monitor standard levels and identify areas of 
operational risks (Flight Data Monitoring System, 2012).  The primary function of the 
system is to monitor flight operations, record pilot deviations, and flag any flight 
deviations that exceed operational limitations and policies.  This system provides each 
airline’s safety department the capability to identify possible trends and mitigate risks 
experienced during flights as a result of deficiencies among pilots, communication skills 
with air traffic control (ATC), and/or weak SOPs (Flight Data Monitoring System, 2012). 
 The FDM system records and processes flagged pilot deviations, such as hard 
landings and unstable approaches, according to pre-selected parameters that are in 
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accordance with the airline’s SOPs (Flight Data Monitoring System, 2012).  Flight events 
are categorized under three severity levels: minor, major, and critical.  Depending on the 
extent of the deviation, a severity level would be assigned.  For example, flying at a 
speed of 260 knots instead of the limit of 250 knots when the aircraft is below 5,000 feet 
would trigger a minor event since the exceedance level is not severe.  On the other hand, 
flying an unstable approach due to an incorrect aircraft configuration below 1,000 feet 
would generate a major or critical event. 
Pilot Deviations.  According to the FAA (2009), pilot deviations are actions or 
inactions that disagree with SOPs and published regulations.  Three areas of pilot 
deviations were analyzed: hard landings, unstable approaches, and general pilot 
deviations in various flight phases.   
According to Air MENA, nine published stabilized approach criteria must be 
achieved by 1,000 feet in either instrument or visual metrological conditions; otherwise, a 
go-around must be conducted (Operations Manual Part A, 2012d, Chapter 8.3.20.17.2, 
pp. 117-118).  Additional approach criteria include: 
1. The airplane is on the correct path; 
2. Pitch is within +10o and -0o; 
3. Bank is no more than 7o; 
4. Speed is within target speed +10 knots and Landing Reference Speed (VREF) 
/ Lowest Selectable Speed (VLS), excluding minor deviations due to gusty 
conditions on final approach; 
5. The airplane is in the correct and briefed landing configuration; 
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6. Sink rate is not more than 1,000 feet per minute, or a rate of descent 
appropriate to aircraft type and configuration, or as required by the approach 
procedure; 
7. Power setting is appropriate for the airplane configuration and is not below the 
minimum power for approach as defined by the aircraft operating manual.  
Significant changes are only permitted for gust compensation; 
8. All briefings and checklists have been completed; and 
9. ILS approaches shall be flown within one dot of glide slope and localizer.  
During non-precision approaches the course deviation must stay within ½ dot 
or 2.5 degrees for very-high-frequency omni-range navigation equipment 
(VOR) approaches and 5 degrees for a non-directional beacon (NDB) 
approaches. 
In terms of hard landings, the FDM system defines this event as excessive vertical 
loads exerted on the main landing gear (Flight Data Monitoring System, 2012).  The unit 
used for this event is Gravity (G) and each aircraft type has different lateral load limits 
that are pre-defined in the FDM system.  Hard landings may result in high loads on the 
main landing gear that could damage aircraft structures (Aigoin, 2012).  Other negative 
outcomes associated with hard landings include pilot-induced oscillations, loss-of-
control, and lateral excursions.  By reviewing FDM systems, certain aircraft parameters 
associated with hard landings, such as aircraft weight, vertical speed, and vertical 
acceleration, could be identified (Aigoin, 2012).  Besides unstable approaches and hard 
landings, additional pilot deviations will be reviewed, such as speed exceedances, 
excessive bank angles, and overweight landing. 
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 Air Safety Reports (ASR) 
 Air MENA maintains a positive safety reporting culture where crewmembers 
report their errors and experiences through safety report forms.  These forms are 
reviewed and analyzed by safety investigators at the safety department.  Depending on 
the severity of events, recommendations are made to the Training and Flight Operations 
departments to provide additional training and implement required operational changes.  
A number of events require crewmembers to file a report, such as (Operations Manual 
Part A, 2012a, Chapter 11.6.2, pp. 16-18): 
1. An emergency is declared; 
2. A runway or taxiway incursion/excursion; 
3. Go-around below 1,000 feet above ground level; 
4. A bird strike or wildlife strike; or 
5. Aircraft evacuation. 
Unfortunately, the reporting system at Air MENA identifies the name and staff 
numbers of the involved crewmembers.  Since the reports are identified among the 
departments, pilots may view this as a punitive system and feel that filing an ASR may 
jeopardize their jobs.  A sample of an ASR is attached in Appendix B. 
Non-Technical Skills 
 Since the 1980s, CRM has been studied from a developmental point of view, 
taking into consideration human error, hazards, risks, and TEM (Kanki et al., 2010).  
When analyzing pilots’ behaviors and attitudes, it is necessary to explore their non-
technical CRM skills.  Non-technical skills are defined as “the cognitive and social skills 
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of flight crewmembers on the flight deck, not directly related to aircraft control, system 
management, and standard operating procedures” (Flin et al., 2003, p. 96).   
Non-technical skills include: communication, situational awareness, decision-
making, leadership, and teamwork (Kanki et al., 2010).  Incorporation of non-technical 
skills into CRM training is viewed as a positive move toward the understanding of 
attitudinal and behavioral implications by crewmembers (Powell & Hill, 2006).  
Incorporating CRM training as an error countermeasure alone will not result in 
behavioral changes on the flight deck (Helmreich & Wilhelm, 1998).  Despite the 
remarkable evolution that CRM has undergone, it still lacks a crucial cultural dimension 
that provides a clear two-way communication between superiors and subordinates 
(Edkins & Pfister, 2003).  When viewed from a cultural perspective, a first officer may be 
hesitant to point out an error to his/her captain out of respect.  A study by Kanki et al., 
(2010) concluded that culture, and particularly national culture, impacts CRM training 
and impedes its transfer to the flight deck.  Inclusion of non-technical skills in CRM 
training is a preliminary approach to understanding safety culture and its influence on 
pilots’ performance (Edkins & Pfister, 2003).  Presumably, pilots will become more 
aware of cultural influences by combining non-technical skills training with CRM 
training. 
Culture 
High risk organizations, such as airlines, nuclear power plants, hospitals, and 
maritime, are highly dependent on the reliability of human performances and the 
effectiveness of their interactions (Haber & Shurberg, 2002).  High risk organizations 
involved in these industries have implemented multiple defense systems comprised of a 
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combination of human input and computerized systems to reduce the chances of injuries 
and loss of human life (Powell & Hill, 2006).  Nevertheless, between 80% and 90% of 
accidents and incidents are attributed to unsafe behaviors among employees (Cox, Jones, 
& Rycraft, 2004).  
Unsafe behaviors are a result of weaknesses in several primary non-technical 
skills that include: communication, decision-making, leadership, and workload 
management (Mjøs, 2004).  Studies have demonstrated that these non-technical skills are 
highly influenced by cultural variations among employees (Mjøs, 2004).  Culture is 
defined as “the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of 
one group or category of people from another” (Hofstede, 2001, p. 9).  
A homogeneous culture is a culture “in which the shared meanings are similar and 
little variation in beliefs exists; that is, the culture has one dominant way of thinking and 
acting” (Hahn, 2010, para. 10).  Because homogeneous cultures share similar beliefs and 
values, the degree of consensus among their societies is stronger than a cross-cultural 
society (Hahn, 2010).  
Hahn defines cross-culture (heterogeneous) as a culture “in which numerous 
population groups have specific and distinct values and understandings” (2010, para. 10), 
and has numerous values and beliefs that shape the ideologies of a diverse society (Hahn, 
2010).  As such, cross-cultures tend to be less congruent than homogeneous cultures 
because they involve diversified attitudes and beliefs.  
According to Barinaga (2007), homogeneous and cross-cultural work forces 
approach and perform organizational tasks differently.  It has been shown that complex 
interactions among group members, such as pilots and ATC, are less effective in cross-
  
45 
cultural groups than in homogeneous groups (Barinaga, 2007).  Variations in 
performances may be due to the differences in communication and behavioral skills that 
form the basis of non-technical skills (Barinaga, 2007). 
Individuals and groups in organizations are influenced by the different values, 
beliefs, and norms that are entrenched in their behaviors and attitudes (Stolzer et al., 
2008).  Fostering a cross-cultural environment without an effective organizational safety 
culture that trains personnel to bridge cultural differences may lead to weaknesses and 
breakdowns of the organization’s safeguards and defense systems (Haber & Shurberg, 
2002). 
Organizations often learn from one another when addressing safety measures 
(Drogoul, Kinnersly, Roelen, & Kirwan, 2007).  However, it is crucial for organizations 
to have a clear understanding of their own safety requirements as these requirements vary 
depending on the type of operations involved (Drogoul et al., 2007).  Airlines operate 
globally and their operations involve cross-cultural interactions among employees.  Thus, 
behavior-based interventions provide effective strategies when designing regulations and 
standard operating procedures (Cox et al., 2004).  These interventions explain human 
factor deficiencies that influence operational safety, one of which is culture (Cox et al., 
2004). 
Cross-Culture and Effectiveness of CRM.  Airlines have adopted CRM training 
as a booster for non-technical skills among airline pilots (Salas et al., 2001).  However, 
the notion that CRM is not influenced by culture is false (Wise et al., 2010).  CRM was 
designed and implemented by North Americans as a solution for human factor intricacies 
among North American pilots, and thus, CRM is not culturally calibrated to 
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accommodate pilots from other regions in the world (Wise et al., 2010).  Traditional 
CRM programs had Western cultural “imprints” and thus clashed with values held by 
other national cultures (Helmreich & Merritt, 2000).  For example, the concept that co-
pilots should be assertive and question decisions made by captains has not transferred 
positively in many countries due to cultural attributes that restrict these behaviors 
between subordinates and superiors (Helmreich & Merritt, 2000).   
Helmreich (2000b) stated that global airlines should adopt CRM training as an 
approach to manage and mitigate threat and error on the flight deck.  Indeed, CRM 
programs are designed to train pilots for non-technical skills that would aid them in 
decision-making processes (Harris & Muir, 2005).  However, there have been numerous 
controversies concerning CRM’s acceptance among airline pilots and its positive transfer 
from the classroom to the flight deck (Helmreich & Merritt, 2000).  Salas, Wilson, Burke, 
and Burke (2006) conducted reviews on several studies that evaluated the effectiveness of 
CRM training.  These studies focused on two underpinning questions that provided 
learning and behavioral evidence from CRM training (Salas, Wilson, Burke, & Burke, 
2006, pp. 401-402): 
1. Do trainees learn from CRM training? 
2. Do trainees apply the learned CRM behaviors? 
Inconsistencies in the results indicate that CRM is influenced by culture 
(Helmreich & Merritt, 2000).  Performing tasks safely in a cross-cultural flight deck 
depends on effective utilization of automation systems and efficient communication 
skills, particularly during flight phases that involve high workload, such as approach and 
landing (Mjøs, 2004).  Consequently, a culturally influenced flight deck environment has 
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led to further implications in important operational facets including communication skills 
and crewmembers’ effective interaction with the aircraft’s automation systems (Yang, 
2005; Sherman, Helmreich, & Merritt, 1997).  A high number of the studies reviewed 
indicated positive and negative effects of CRM training (Salas, Wilson, Burke, & Burke, 
2006).     
Cross-Culture and Adaptation to Aircraft Automation.  The end of the 1960s 
marked a new era for the airline industry, particularly with regard to aircraft technology 
(Wise et al., 2010).  Supported by a strong economy and market expansions, air travel 
growth was at an all-time high (Wise et al., 2010).  Recognizing the poor safety records, 
and human imperfections and errors, manufacturers developed advanced automated 
aircraft systems to meet industry standards (Edkins & Pfister, 2003).  Safety levels 
improved considerably and transformed airlines into an advanced computerized type of 
operation (Wise et al., 2010).  The decrease in accident rates was not only due to the 
introduction of automation, but also due to enhanced power plant reliability, better 
meteorological forecasting, higher fidelity simulators, tightened training standards, and 
other initiatives that all contributed to increased safety levels (Wise et al., 2010). 
While safety records have improved since the introduction of automation on the 
flight deck, accidents attributed to human error have reached a plateau at approximately 
70% since the 1970s (Hansman, 2001).  The nature of error, however, has transferred 
from poor piloting skills to improper use of automation (Dekker, 2006b).  Studies have 
shown that 50% of aircraft accidents and incidents are a result of flight deck design 
(Kinnersley & Roelen, 2007).  Pilots did not adapt well to automated aircraft and, 
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therefore, these advanced support systems have become traps (Kinnersley & Roelen, 
2007).  Hansman (2001) identified two causes behind pilots’ difficulties in adaptation: 
1. Flying habits are difficult to change.  Transitioning from non-glass to glass 
flight decks can be demanding, particularly for experienced pilots with 
thousands of hours on conventional airplanes; and 
2. All automated aircraft systems are displayed in English, where English is a 
second language for many pilots. 
Further studies have revealed a third weak link between pilots and automation.  
Pilots tend to use 20% of the features in aircraft automation not only because of habitual 
restrictions and language barriers alone, but because of cross-cultural attributes and 
beliefs as well (Helmreich, 2008).  Pilots’ reliance on automation systems varies by pilot 
nationality (Sherman, Helmreich, & Merritt, 1997).   
A study by the European Coordination Centre for Research and Documentation in 
Social Sciences revealed that different cultures interacted with aircraft automation in 
various ways (Sherman et al., 1997).  Pilots from individualistic and egalitarian nations, 
such as the United States and Ireland, can manage the automation system without 
difficulties, but would rather manually fly the airplane (Strauch, 2010).  Alternatively, 
pilots from hierarchical nations, such as China and Taiwan, manage the automation 
system with difficulties, but would rather rely on them, because they trust the system 
more than themselves (Sherman et al., 1997).  Pilots from hierarchical nations also tend 
to strictly adhere to set procedures and rules; therefore, they depend on automation 
systems (Strauch, 2010).  Unexpected deviations may confuse pilots from hierarchical 
nations and lead to poor decision-making (Sherman et al., 1997).  A recent example of 
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this complication is the crash of Asiana Flight 214 in San Francisco in July 2013, where 
the auto-throttle did not operate as expected and may have led to confusion on various 
auto-flight modes (Croft, 2013).     
Misuse and disuse of automation systems are two primary causes that may 
degrade operational safety (Lee & See, 2004).  Misuse refers to inappropriate reliance on, 
and usage of, the automation system while disuse refers to insufficient usage and distrust 
of the automation system (Lee & See, 2004).  Misuse and disuse are both side effects of 
automation for cross-cultural crewmembers (Strauch, 2010) 
Societies are often categorized according to certain traits and beliefs that 
differentiate them from one another (Hofstede, 2001).  Hierarchical societies accept 
inequality and behave with a collectivist mindset (Moran et al., 2011).  Individuals from 
these societies are often reticent and reserved, yet success-oriented (Moran et al., 2011).  
On the other hand, egalitarian societies are dominated by individualistic ideologies 
(Moran et al., 2011).  Egalitarians are often short-term-oriented and can work in groups 
(Hofstede, 2001).  The aforementioned differences between societies have a direct impact 
on pilots’ willingness to interact with automation systems (Sherman et al., 1997).  Figure 
13 lists some of the egalitarian and hierarchical societies. 
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Figure 13. Egalitarian versus hierarchal societies. Adapted from “Managing Across 
Cultures,” by C. M. Solomon & M. S. Schell, 2009. Copyright 2009 by McGraw-Hill 
books. 
 
 
 
Cross-Culture and Variations in Communication Styles.  Communication is 
defined as a multi-dimensional process of exchanging information between individuals 
via verbal and non-verbal methods (Barak, 2011).  Cross-cultural communication can 
present challenges and barriers due to differences in beliefs, values, and languages 
(Solomon & Schell, 2009).  Language diversity plays a prominent role in creating 
operational challenges in a cross-cultural environment (Thomas, 2008).  Ineffective 
communication due to language barriers may lead to poor situational awareness and 
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lower confidence levels among crewmembers (Lichacz, 2008).  Although English is the 
primary language in international businesses and organizations, it is often used as a 
second language, which creates a number of disadvantages (Thomas, 2008): 
1. Mental exhaustion; 
2. Fluency in a second language may create an impression of competency in 
other aspects; 
3. First-language speakers tend to slow down their rate of speech and simplify 
their sentences in response to second-language speakers; and 
4. Second-language speakers may pretend to understand first-language speakers 
to avoid embarrassment. 
 Cross-cultural communication is constrained by the cultural inputs provided by 
the speaker (Hofstede et al., 2010).  These inputs are implemented unintentionally and are 
a byproduct of cultural influences (Solomon & Schell, 2009).  In order to gain effective 
communication in a cross-culture environment, it is important to understand the different 
communication styles: 
1. Direct versus indirect: the idea of speaking one’s mind in a clear and concise 
manner is considered a direct style (Solomon & Schell, 2009).  In contrast, the 
context of the message in an indirect communication relies on the tone of the 
voice and non-verbal communication (Solomon & Schell, 2009).  Non-verbal 
communication may create additional barriers to cross-cultural 
communication due to uncommon body language, movements, gestures, and 
postures (Barak, 2011).  Nevertheless, nonverbal communication provides a 
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higher level of trust (Barak, 2011).  For example, a pat on the back is an 
indication of satisfaction and a job well done. 
2. High context versus low context: individuals with a high context style tend to 
demand a comprehensive explanation with explicit details concerning the 
information being exchanged, whereas low context individuals expect only the 
information needed to complete a certain task (Yang, 2005).  Any additional 
information may lead to confusion and time wasted (Yang, 2005).  For 
example, pilots may provide long briefings that include irrelevant information, 
which may lead to confusion.  On the other hand, a concise briefing that 
includes only information relevant to a certain procedure may be more 
efficient and lead to a better understanding. 
 Not surprisingly, members of a cross-cultural organization tend to adapt to 
variations in communication styles (Barak, 2011).  More often than not, a positive work 
environment is maintained as a result of cross-cultural harmony (Barak, 2011).  But to 
what extent would these members alter their communication styles?  Communication 
differences may be perceived incorrectly and provoke an undesired work atmosphere 
(Barak, 2011). 
 A study conducted by Pekerti and Thomas (2003) examined communication 
behaviors between 48 Anglo-European New Zealanders and 48 Asians, primarily from 
China.  Each New Zealander was paired with an Asian participant to rank crimes 
according to severity levels in 15 minutes.  To complete the task, participants used 
communication styles adapted from their own culture to interact with other nationalities 
(Pekerti & Thomas, 2003).  It was concluded that individuals in a cross-cultural 
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interaction tend to exaggerate their cultural behaviors in an effort to clarify their 
intentions (Pekerti & Thomas, 2003). 
 Another study was conducted in 2003 to compare communication skills between 
three groups: American crewmembers, Chinese crewmembers, and cross-cultural 
crewmembers (Salas, Wilson, Burke, Wightman, & Howse, 2006).  The evaluation of the 
three groups suggested that homogeneous members communicated better and made fewer 
errors than heterogeneous members (Salas, Wilson, Burke, Wightman, & Howse, 2006). 
Furthermore, Mjøs (2004) stated that cross-cultural interactions may negatively influence 
work performance, particularly when tasks are accomplished by means of effective 
communication, such as workload coordination and management. 
 Due to the existence of a cross-cultural work force on the flight deck with a 
multitude of linguistic abilities, ICAO has set the English language as the international 
language in aviation (Tiewtrakul & Fletcher, 2010).  This standardization, known as 
Aviation English, involves specific phraseologies to simplify the communication process 
and eliminate potential errors between pilots, and between pilots and air traffic 
controllers (Alderson, 2009).  According to the regulations outlined by the GCAA, 
“pilots who are required to use the radio telephone aboard an aircraft shall demonstrate 
the ability to speak and understand the English language” (GCAA, 2013b, p. 1-B-2). 
 As more international airlines are sharing the skies, Aviation English skills are 
becoming an integral part of a pilot’s life (Sharkey, 2012).  Communication problems 
still degrade safety levels, despite English being the required language of operation 
(Tiewtrakul & Fletcher, 2010).  Since cross-culture has a strong influence on 
communication skills, airlines with a diverse international pilot population must dedicate 
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special attention toward standardizing their pilots by providing Aviation English training 
courses. 
Safety Culture 
 Amid the rapid growth of economic globalization, industries have become 
dependent on cross-cultural work forces, and it is unrealistic for an organization to 
maintain homogeneous cultures within its work environment (Thomas, 2008).  A 
dependency on a diverse work force has evolved the nature of the work force and created 
a complex environment in which an organization must perform (Wiegmann, Zhang,    
von Thaden, Sharma, & Gibbons, 2004).  Toward this end, culture has been viewed as the 
primary influence of an individual’s attitude and behavior that directly influences his/her 
performance (Griswold, 2013). 
Organizations must understand cross-cultural concepts and recognize their 
influences on safety (Kelly & Patankar, 2004).  “Lacking knowledge of what other 
cultures do, it is difficult to notice what one’s own culture does not do” (Hutchins, 
Holder, & Pérez, 2002, p. 12).  Understanding the differences between individuals’ 
attitudes and behaviors when developing an organizational structure provides the 
foundation for a positive operational management (Hofstede et al., 2010).   
Evaluating the types of pilot errors committed in a cross-cultural environment and 
examining potential training programs that may improve the performance of cross-
cultural crewmembers are considered proactive interventions that form the basis of 
healthy safety cultures (Helmreich, 2008).  The Health and Safety Commission in the 
United Kingdom defined safety culture as (Health and Safety Executive, 2009): 
  
55 
The safety culture of an organization is the product of individual and group 
values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behavior that 
determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organization’s 
health and safety management.  Organizations with a positive safety culture are 
characterized by communications founded on mutual trust, by shared perceptions 
of the importance of safety and by confidence in the efficacy of preventive 
measures. (pp. 39-40) 
 Achieving a positive safety culture is a complex task.  Commitment to high safety 
standards and effective operations must be initiated from the highest point of an 
organization’s structure.  Therefore, establishing and maintaining a positive safety culture 
begins with the organization’s management (Kelly & Patankar, 2004).  A positive safety 
culture requires the involvement and empowerment of employees as integral participants 
of the organization (Snyder, 2007). 
 The absence of a healthy safety culture may lead to subcultures within an 
organization (Gadd & Collins, 2002).  The development of subcultures is a result of 
existing variations in risk levels and working conditions in an organization (Gadd & 
Collins, 2002).  This development is not considered detrimental to operational safety; 
however, subcultures must be identified and engineered to satisfy organizational safety 
requirements (Antonsen, 2009).  Kelly and Patankar (2004) stated that a positive safety 
culture enables organizations to establish:  
1. Better communication among their employees; 
2. Higher levels of assertiveness; and 
3. Higher levels of employee-management trust.  (p. 72) 
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“The assessment of safety culture may provide leading indicators of the level of 
safety that exists in an organization and may be used to benchmark organizational safety 
performance” (Mariscal, Herrero, & Otero, 2012, p. 1237).  Three underpinning cultural 
groupings have been viewed as influential to airline operations: national, professional, 
and organizational (Helmreich, Wilhelm, Klinect, & Merritt, 2001).  The following 
section describes these three cultural groupings and discusses how each cultural grouping 
can impact operational safety.  
National Culture.  Behaviors, attitudes, and values based on national heritage 
define national culture (Helmreich, 1999).  National culture, like any other type of 
culture, forms a range of diversity within an organization.  The diversity within an 
organization is influenced by complex socio-cultural factors; therefore, diverse 
organizations are hindered by stereotypical and inflexible attitudes (Moran et al., 2011).  
These attitudes weaken the organization’s defense systems by affecting major operational 
components such as interaction and communication among team members (Moran et al., 
2011). 
Despite culture variations, pilots from across the globe are expected to aviate, 
communicate, and perform as an effective crewmember in any region of the world 
(Mumaw & Holder, 2002).  However, airplanes are not manufactured to accommodate 
culture variations.  Mumaw and Holder (2002) stated that individuals from various 
geographical regions interact and perform differently.  Crewmembers with diverse 
national cultures communicate with various styles and behave according to certain 
attributes that have implications on operational safety (Helmreich, 2000b).  Furthermore, 
situational awareness of cross-cultural crewmembers may be compromised due to 
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ineffective communication as a result of language differences and behavior variations 
(Lichacz, 2008).   
Given the objectives of this study, culture can be viewed as the actions performed 
or omitted by commercial pilots as a result of norms, values, and beliefs adopted from 
their cultural backgrounds.  Examining the effects of national culture on flight deck 
behavior can be a challenging task.  However, a four-dimensional culture model 
developed by Hofstede in the 1960s and 1970s forms a reliable methodology to assess 
cultural influences (Helmreich, 2000b).  A dimension is defined by Hofstede et al., 
(2010) as “an aspect of a culture that can be measured relative to other cultures” (p. 31). 
The following four dimensions form the basis of their cultural model:  
1. Power Distance (PD): Inequality between subordinates and superiors is viewed 
differently by various cultures.  Consequently, societies accept and handle 
power distribution accordingly (Hofstede et al., 2010).  In societies with high 
levels of PD, a subordinate does not question the decisions made by his/her 
superior and accepts the superior’s course of action (Helmreich, 2000b).   
This type of behavior on the flight deck is reflected by polarized relations 
between the subordinate and superior (Hofstede, 2001).  This relationship leads 
to lack of assertiveness by subordinates.  Brazil, Philippines, and Taiwan are 
examples of countries that have high PD scores.   
Organizations with high PD have centralized decision structures and 
authoritative management that creates inequality among the employees 
(Hofstede, 2001).  Organizations with low PD refer to flat organizational 
structures with direct and open communication between managers and 
  
58 
employees (Hofstede, 2001).  Denmark, Norway, and the United States are 
examples of countries that have low PD scores. 
The impact of PD on flight deck behavior was noted as one of the 
factors that led to the crash of a Japanese cargo aircraft in 1977 (Strauch, 
2010).  The crew composition of this flight consisted of one American captain, 
one Japanese first officer, and one Japanese flight engineer.  Investigations 
revealed that the captain was intoxicated and blood tests showed a blood 
alcohol level of 0.29% (Strauch, 2010).  The bus driver who transported the 
crewmembers to the airport noticed the captain’s behavior and alerted his 
dispatcher.  Also, the first officer and flight engineer noticed the captain’s 
behavior and were aware of his intoxication.  However, neither of the Japanese 
crew attempted to confront the captain (Strauch, 2010).  Since Japan scores 
high on PD, the crew may have avoided confronting their superior because that 
would have caused humiliation and hierarchal degradation (Strauch, 2010).  
2. Individualism versus Collectivism (IDV): This dimension refers to the degree 
to which certain goals are pursued to achieve personal interests compared to a 
group to which that individual belongs (Hofstede, 2001).  Societies can be 
divided into two categories: individualistic and collectivistic (Strauch, 2010).  
In an individualistic society, individuals are inclined towards their own 
interests and taking care of themselves and immediate family/organization 
members (Hofstede et al., 2010).  On the other hand, in a collectivistic society, 
the interest of group members is considered a priority over individual interests 
(Hofstede et al., 2010).  Communication skills among members of a 
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collectivistic society are more easily achieved since they attain a sense of team 
orientation (Helmreich, 2000b). 
An example of IDV was noted in the crash of Avianca flight 52 in 
1990, from Medellin to John F. Kennedy airport in New York.  The crew did 
not declare a mayday regarding their critical fuel situation, as they did not feel 
comfortable being positioned ahead of the other traffic (Salas, Wilson, Burke, 
Wightman, & Howse, 2006). 
3. Masculinity versus Femininity (MAS): Members of a masculine society tend to 
be more assertive, ambitious, competitive, and reward-oriented (Strauch, 
2010).  In contrast, members of a feminine society are expected to behave with 
modesty and interpersonal concern (Hofstede et al., 2010).  In a feminine 
society, men and women are expected to behave similarly with modest and 
tender attitudes (Hofstede et al., 2010).  “Masculinity stands for a society in 
which social gender roles are clearly distinct: Men are supposed to be 
assertive, tough, and focused on material success; women are supposed to be 
more modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life” (Hofstede, 2001, 
p. 297).   
4. Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI): Societies tolerate future ambiguities and 
uncertainties differently (Strauch, 2010).  An individual not having control of 
the future may develop a sense of distress and fear (Hofstede et al., 2010).  
Crewmembers with a high level of uncertainty will not deviate from 
procedures since they provide a sense of familiarity and comfort (Strauch, 
2010).  On the other hand, crewmembers from societies with low UAI are 
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more likely to be relaxed and deviate from procedures with no sense of alarm 
or discomfort (Hofstede et al., 2010). 
This dimension is reflected in the investigation of a Colombian aircraft 
that crashed on approach to New York.  Avianca Flight 52 flew from Medellin 
to John F. Kennedy airport and was piloted by two Colombian pilots who 
failed to inform air traffic control of their fuel emergency (Strauch, 2010).  
Despite their low fuel status, they failed to consider alternative airports, which 
may have been influenced by their high uncertainty levels and unfamiliarity of 
the area (Strauch, 2010).  Appendix C - Table C1 lists the dimensional scores 
for different nationalities involved in this study.  
Professional Culture.  Every profession develops certain attitudes and behaviors 
that are expressed by members of the profession (Helmreich & Merritt, 2000).  Pilot 
uniforms and airline badges are physical characteristics from which pilots develop a 
strong sense of professional culture (Helmreich, 2008).  These characteristics may create 
negative cultural aspects reflected by a sense of invulnerability, or, positive culture 
aspects reflected by good work ethics (Helmreich & Merritt, 2003). 
Negative professional culture poses a threat to operational safety as pilots fail to 
recognize their limitations while rejecting CRM concepts and ideologies (Helmreich & 
Wilhelm, 1998).  An example of negative professional culture is a pilot who refuses 
assistance from a team member and prefers to work alone to maintain his/her high level 
of self-esteem and pride.  Professional culture can lead to further safety implications due 
to disregarding health conditions, fatigue, and reluctance to admit error (Helmreich & 
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Merritt, 2003).  Alternatively, a positive professional culture is reflected by a sense of 
pride and an overwhelming interest for the job. 
Most pilots tend to have a high degree of pride for their profession and an affinity 
for their organizational position (Helmreich & Merritt, 2000).  Pilots with a positive 
professional culture will demonstrate desirable leadership skills, establish clear 
communication, adhere to procedures, and obey regulations (Helmreich & Merritt, 2003).   
Organizational Culture.  Organizational culture is an ensemble of complex 
cultural elements, infusing myriad beliefs, norms, and attitudes shared and expressed by 
members of an organization (Wise et al., 2010).  Organizational culture can be viewed as 
a socially constructed system in which members of its organization are distinguished 
from members of other organizations (Hofstede et al., 2010).  Despite the presence of 
cultural differences, organizations tend to integrate their cultural diversity with common 
practices that shape the organizational culture by defining their own values and beliefs 
(Wise et al., 2010).  Sexton and Klinect (2001) defined organizational culture as “the 
shared way members have learned to think, perceive, and behave in relation to 
organizational issues, tasks, and problems” (p. 7). 
Organizations are structured in ways that directly impact the types of cultures 
existing within their boundaries (Daft, 2007).  In order to achieve the desired operational 
requirements, organizations must encourage adaptability and responsiveness toward 
certain aspects, such as regulatory obligations, that necessitate the implementation of 
safety programs (Daft, 2007).  These obligations can be achieved in various ways that 
dictate the type of organizational culture created (Haber & Shurberg, 2002).  
Management’s involvement and commitment to operational obligations are an integral 
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factor in determining the organizational culture developed and the overall safety climate 
(Choudhry, Fang, & Mohamed, 2007).   
Moreover, organizational culture impacts the safety performance of an 
organization by shaping its members’ perceptions about the importance of safety 
(Hayward, 1997).  Besides management’s commitment to safety, an organization’s 
communication style has a strong impact on members’ attitudes toward safety 
(Helmreich, 1999).  Hayward (1997) identified three types of organizational 
communication styles: 
1. Pathological: Information is treated with political sensitivity and 
resembles power.  As a result, communication becomes ineffective and 
creates undesirable outcomes (Hayward, 1997). 
2. Bureaucratic: Minimal line of communication is provided between 
management and employees with a rigid relationship among team 
members (Daft, 2007).  Bureaucratic organizations experience challenges 
when dealing with emergencies and change (Hayward, 1997). 
3. Informative: An open line of communication between management and 
employees is established with a sense of equality (Daft, 2007).  Members 
of an informative organization are empowered by partaking in decision-
making processes (Hayward, 1997).    
Cross-Cultural Management 
Globalization has revolutionized international markets and transformed the 
methods of conducting business into unlimited boundaries of worldwide connectivity and 
cultural diversity in organizations (Dong & Liu, 2010).  While the inclusion of cross-
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cultures in international organizations has been viewed as a positive change, it has led to 
undesirable states within organizations (Dong & Liu, 2010).  The attitudes and behaviors 
of cross-cultural work forces may be influenced by globalization, particularly at high-risk 
industries, such as health care, maritime, nuclear power plants, and oil and gas 
(Youngdahl, Ramaswamy, & Dash, 2010).   
Consequently, new organizational strategies have been created in order to develop 
and maintain high levels of safety standards among cross-cultural work forces (Dong & 
Liu, 2010).  According to Dong and Liu (2010), a cross-cultural team within an 
organization may lead to internal conflicts between team members that may degrade 
operational safety and performance.  The following sections discuss cross-cultural 
implications in four high-risk industries: nuclear power, maritime, health care, and oil 
and gas. 
Nuclear Power Plant.  Cross-cultural studies have become a focus and primary 
concern among high-risk industries, particularly after the Chernobyl accident in 1986 
(Mariscal et al., 2012).  The concept of safety culture emerged as a result of the 
Chernobyl accident (Meshkati, 1998).  Reactor number four at the Ukrainian power plant 
exploded, releasing contaminants and fission products into the atmosphere (Zhang, 
Wiegmann, von Thaden, Sharma, & Mitchell, 2002).  The contaminants spread over 
Scandinavian and West European countries, increasing the risk of cancer (Zhang et al., 
2002).  Although several events led to the Chernobyl accident, a poor safety culture was 
identified as a contributing factor (Zhang et al., 2002). 
In light of an investigation of the Chernobyl disaster, several organizational 
deficiencies were identified as contributing factors to the accident.  A review of the 
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findings revealed major design flaws of the reactor that affected power level controls 
during critical operational phases (Schmid, 2011).  Certain procedures led to power 
surges and rapid shut downs of the reactor (Schmid, 2011). Soviet nuclear scientists were 
aware of the reactor’s design flaws and failed to act upon operational complaints with a 
complete disregard of any possibilities that the reactor may explode (Schmid, 2011).  
The final report concluded that a poor safety culture at the Ukrainian power plant 
was due to ineffective communication between members of the organization that resulted 
in an unclear understanding of responsibilities and poor cooperation between work 
members (Schmid, 2011).  Despite the unfortunate events at Chernobyl, beneficial 
operational concepts emerged to develop positive safety attitudes and behaviors, 
including improvements in leadership principles and values through effective 
communication styles (Mariscal et al., 2012). 
The European Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM) conducted a study on 
positive safety attitudes and behaviors (Mariscal et al., 2012).  Their study aimed at 
increasing efficiency and strengthening operational quality in private and public 
organizations (Mariscal et al., 2012).  An EFQM model was developed to evaluate the 
operations of safety management at organizations through a self-assessment process 
(Mariscal et al., 2012). 
Mariscal et al. (2012) discussed the use of the EFQM model to evaluate a Spanish 
nuclear power plant.  The findings from the self-assessment highlighted required 
improvements in safety procedures and implementations.  The following list includes 
some of the required improvements (Mariscal et al., 2012): 
1. Safety roles must be defined for all work grades; 
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2. Dissemination of information and knowledge between senior and junior staff 
must improve to ensure continuity of effective operations; 
3. Improvements in communications between management and workers to 
highlight nuclear safety; and 
4. Reduce work overload to increase improvement opportunities. 
Towards this end, findings from the Chernobyl accident and the EFQM model 
share a common operational requirement: communication.  Lee and Harrison (2000) 
encapsulated the importance of communication by means of identifying roles and 
responsibilities through effective communication between members of an organization.  
Also, they found that establishing a shared perception of the importance of safety and 
developing a proactive attitude toward safety measures would shape a positive safety 
culture (Lee & Harrison, 2000). 
Maritime.  Cross-cultural conflicts are particularly visible in the maritime 
industry where a single ship may include a crew composition of multiple nationalities and 
cultures (Horck, 2008).  Maritime operations require extensive teamwork efforts and 
good communication skills between team members on the ship and at port (Horck, 2008).  
With cross-cultural crewmembers, ship owners are faced with degraded quality of work 
due to poor communication skills between ship crewmembers and port officers that could 
lead to misunderstandings (Horck, 2008).   
In 2007, a Hong Kong-registered vessel named Cosco Busan struck a pier in San 
Francisco (Coury, Ellingstad, & Kolly, 2010).  According to the National Transportation 
Safety Board (NTSB) (2009), cross-culture was a primary contributor to the accident.  
The captain of the vessel, a Chinese national, and the Pilot who navigated the vessel to 
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the harbor, an American national, both had more than 20 years of experience (Strauch, 
2010).  However, due to cultural and language differences between the captain and Pilot, 
a clear line of authority was lost and it was unclear who was in charge of the vessel 
(National Transportation Safety Board, 2009).  The captain did not review or monitor the 
Pilot’s navigation to the harbor; instead, he transferred his authority to the Pilot by 
relying on the Pilot’s navigation (Strauch, 2010).  By doing so, the captain neglected to 
observe the Pilot’s navigational procedures and assumed the correct actions were taken.  
The following is a statement given by the captain during an interview (NTSB, 2009, 
pp. 67-68): 
Normally as a captain I would welcome the Pilot with my open arms, enthusiastic, 
and I would show my hospitality in offering him if he need any food or coffee or 
tea … it seems the Pilot coming on board was with cold face, doesn’t want to talk.  
I don’t know if he had a hard day before or because he was unhappy because I 
was a Chinese. 
Certainly, culture played a major role in influencing the captain’s behavior by 
delegating his authority to the Pilot when the captain was in charge of the vessel (Strauch, 
2010).  According to Hofstede (2001), Chinese society is hierarchal, which is influenced 
by formal authorities and scores high on PD.  Although the captain was in charge of the 
vessel, he may have been intimidated by the Pilot’s assertive attitude and behavior, which 
led him to believe that the Pilot was in charge (NTSB, 2009).  Tension between the 
captain and the Pilot may have arisen because of language differences.  The captain was 
not a native English speaker; therefore, he could have had difficulties interacting with the 
Pilot (NTSB, 2009). 
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Health Care.  The medical industry is evolving into a diversified work force 
where demographic compositions of physicians and patients are continuously 
diversifying (Meeuwesen, Brink-Muinen, & Hofstede, 2009).  According to Betancourt 
(2003), cross-culture between physicians may lead to stereotyping and discriminatory 
treatment of patients, resulting in patients’ dissatisfaction and deteriorating health 
conditions.  It has been deemed critical in the medical sector to train physicians in how to 
effectively communicate and interact in a cross-cultural environment (Betancourt & 
Cervantes, 2009).   
Meeuwesen et al. (2009) conducted a study to analyze how physicians behaved 
with patients from nationalities different from their own.  Patients’ nationalities included 
ten European countries: Belgium, Estonia, Germany, Great Britain, The Netherlands, 
Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.  Their study was based on Hofstede’s 
national dimensions and was categorized into four components (Meeuwesen et al., 2009): 
1. Context variables: patients with a high PD index experienced normal medical 
encounters with their physicians and information shared by the physician was 
made in a professional manner.  Patients from individualistic countries and 
with low PD experienced flexible relations with their physicians, but were 
given delayed diagnoses by following a wait-and-see approach.  Furthermore, 
consultations in wealthier countries were longer and patients recovered more 
quickly. 
2. Physicians’ verbal behavior:  physicians with a high PD index demonstrated a 
gregarious social behavior with affective communication skills.  Physicians 
with a high UAI index focused primarily on psychosocial conversations with 
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their patients.  Individualistic physicians conducted less counseling and asked 
few questions, while physicians with a high MAS index socialized more and 
deviated from the patient’s health issues. 
3. Patients’ verbal behavior: patients with a low PD index communicated less 
formally with their physicians.  On the other hand, patients with a low MAS 
index shared a lot of information with their physicians, focusing primarily on 
psychosocial conversations. 
4. Communication styles: Physicians and patients with a high PD index behaved 
according to their expected roles and shared less information.  On the 
contrary, physicians and patients with a low PD index demonstrated flexible 
communication styles.  Physicians and patients with a high UAI experienced 
more eye contact during their conversation.  Moreover, patients with a low 
MAS index conversed professionally with their physicians and asked 
numerous questions.  
Physicians must recognize and acknowledge the influences of cross-culture on 
their practice to ensure fair treatments (Rothschild, 1998).  Identifying cultural 
differences would aid physicians in developing a culturally-sensitive approach toward 
communicating and interacting with their patients (Rothschild, 1998).  Effective 
communication between physicians and patients would lead to increased accuracy of 
diagnosis and improved physician-patient relations that are based on trust and positive 
sharing of information (Betancourt & Cervantes, 2009). 
Oil and Gas.  The nature of oil and gas operations is complex and involves 
challenges with technological changes and productivity requirements (Mearns & Yule, 
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2009).  Due to the diversified work force in the oil and gas sector, companies must 
maintain a positive safety culture to ensure operational safety (Fitzgerald, 2005).  More 
often than not, these sites are located in less-developed areas where local work forces are 
unfamiliar with appropriate health and safety measures (Mearns & Yule, 2009).  In 2001, 
the government of Norway shared its concerns over degraded safety performances in the 
oil and gas sector and identified cross-culture as a primary challenge that must be 
investigated (Høivik, Moen, Mearns, & Haukelid, 2009). 
One particular example of degraded safety performances in the oil and gas sector 
is the Piper Alpha accident in 1988 that caused the death of 167 men and billions of 
dollars in losses (Paté-Cornell, 1993).  Piper Alpha received and distributed daily oil and 
gas productions to other platforms in the area.  During the distribution stage to other 
platforms, a disturbance occurred that led to a flange leak (Paté-Cornell, 1993).  Released 
vapors initiated several explosions that resulted in damages to oil lines, causing fire 
(Paté-Cornell, 1993). 
One of the condensate pumps on Piper Alpha was undergoing maintenance 
procedures.  In order to initiate the pump’s overhaul procedures, the day shift crew 
removed the pressure safety valve and sealed it with a disk cover (Gordon, 1998).  The 
crew failed to follow proper procedures and did not tag the seal properly.  Furthermore, 
the day shift crew did not share information with the night shift crew with regard to the 
maintenance procedures that they had already started.  The night shift crew started their 
work normally and pressurized the pipe under maintenance that may have led to the 
initial leak (Gordon, 1998).  Clearly, a series of procedural flaws and communication 
failures led to the explosions on Piper Alpha (Gordon, 1998).   
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 While the accident was a result of a number of events, investigations revealed 
that a combination of human errors and poor decisions were contributing factors (Ginn, 
2004).  The organization attained a negative safety culture because management 
prioritized productivity over safety and dedicated insufficient attention to maintenance 
and inspection procedures (Paté-Cornell, 1993). 
Conclusions from the Piper Alpha accident emphasize the importance of 
organizational culture and its impact on operational safety (Fitzgerald, 2005).  Numerous 
regulations and procedures have been put in place since the Piper Alpha accident to 
increase operational safety (Ginn, 2004).  Management must demonstrate its commitment 
to high safety standards through a positive safety policy that allows open communication 
and provides continuous safety training programs (Haber & Shurberg, 2002). 
  Flight Management Attitudes and Safety Survey (FMASS).  Bridging cross-
cultural gaps and achieving coherency among crewmembers are of immense importance 
to operational safety and success.  Several approaches have been utilized by 
organizations to identify the link between safety attitudes and pilot performance with 
regards to acceptance of CRM concepts in a cross-cultural work force (Merritt, 1998).  
Studies on safety-related attitudes began in the 1980s using a questionnaire known as the 
Cockpit Management Attitudes Questionnaire (CMAQ) (Sexton, Wilhelm, Helmreich, 
Merritt, & Klinect, 2001).  CMAQ included limited questions that identified safety-
related attitudes and behaviors among airline pilots (Sexton et al., 2001).  Since then, 
researchers have made extensive progress in this field and updated the attitude 
questionnaire to incorporate Hofstede’s dimensions of national culture (Sexton et al., 
2001).  An updated version of CMAQ, known as Flight Management Attitude 
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Questionnaire (FMAQ), was designed to address national, professional, and 
organizational cultures and identify their effects on cross-cultural pilot performances 
(Sexton et al., 2001). 
Further progress was achieved to link pilot attitudes with performance by 
associating essential FMAQ items with safety-related outcomes.  The Flight Management 
Attitudes and Safety Survey (FMASS) was developed and included four scales with a set 
of questions related to each scale (Sexton et al., 2001): 
1. Safety culture: 
a. The managers in the flight operations listen to us and care about our 
concerns. 
b. My suggestions about safety would be acted upon if I express them to 
management. 
c. Management will never compromise safety concerns for profitability. 
d. I am encouraged by my supervisors and coworkers to report any 
unsafe conditions I observe. 
e. I know the proper channels to report my safety concerns. 
f. I am satisfied with chief pilot and assistant chief pilot availability. 
2. Job attitudes: 
a. I am proud to work for this organization. 
b. Pilot morale is high. 
c. Senior management (VP and above) at this airline are doing a good 
job. 
d. Working here is like being part of a large family. 
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e. I like my job. 
f. Pilots trust senior management at this airline. 
3. Teamwork: 
a. Teamwork with other cockpit crewmembers. 
b. Teamwork with gate agents. 
c. Teamwork with ramp personnel. 
d. Teamwork with flight attendants. 
e. Teamwork with dispatch. 
f. Teamwork with maintenance. 
g. Teamwork with crew scheduling. 
4. Stress recognition: 
a. I am more likely to make judgment errors in abnormal or emergency 
situations. 
b. My decision-making ability is as good in emergencies as in routine 
flying conditions. 
c. I am less effective when stressed or fatigued. 
d. My performance is not adversely affected by working with an 
inexperienced or less capable crewmember. 
e. Personal problems can adversely affect performance. 
f. A truly professional crewmember can leave personal problems behind 
when flying. (p. 4). 
Merritt (2000) recognized that a safe flight is contingent upon the pilots’ 
behaviors and attitudes in a cross-cultural environment.  Although the flight deck is 
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governed by formidable procedures and regulations, pilots must perform in dynamic 
work settings and interact with diverse crewmembers that may alter their attitudes and 
behavior (Gross, 2006).  The aforementioned FMASS scales will aid in understanding 
cross-cultural effects on operations and engineering a safety culture that would aid in 
steering the organization toward required operational standards (Mjøs, 2004).  “Without 
an understanding of its own cultures, organizations cannot mount effective programs to 
optimize them” (Helmreich, 2008, p. 8). 
Once a clear understanding of cross-culture is achieved, appropriate training 
programs must be implemented to synchronize interactions among cross-cultural 
crewmembers (Smith, Singal, & Lamb, 2007).  Training programs and operational 
strategies must be developed in a manner that would add value to the organization by 
empowering employees and anchoring positive safety commitments by management 
(Mittal, 2012).   
Summary 
The review of the relevant literature demonstrated the evolution of CRM through 
six generations where new concepts have emerged to improve threat and error 
management (Kanki et al., 2010).  Despite the improvements in CRM training, pilot error 
remains inevitable (McCartney, 2005).  A study by Tsang and Vidulich (2003) revealed 
that the majority of aircraft accidents and incidents were a result of non-technical pilot 
errors.  Improvements in non-technical skills among pilots involve an understanding of 
their attitudes and behaviors from a cultural perspective (Powell & Hill, 2006). 
IPO.  Several performance and training models have been implemented to aid in 
improving safety levels.  One of these models is the IPO model that examines internal 
  
74 
and external factors influencing crewmembers’ performance during various operational 
phases.  Crewmembers are evaluated on non-technical characteristics, such as culture, 
communication skills, and attitudes (Kanki et al., 2010).  Besides non-technical 
characteristics, the IPO model examines organizational influences, such as policies, 
regulations, and managerial relations with employees.  Implementing an IPO model 
provides a full evaluation of the organization where operational deficiencies are 
identified. 
AQP.  Operational deficiencies may be rectified through an AQP, where training 
curricula are tailored for crewmembers (FAA, 2006a).  Implementation of an AQP is 
voluntary; however, it is recommended as it provides continuous improvements on 
operational requirements.  These improvements are based upon analytical findings 
obtained from training data, which may provide proactive solutions to aid in improving 
training standards. 
FOQA.  Data collection and analysis can be accomplished through a FOQA 
program.  Depending on each airlines’ policies and procedures, data monitoring vary to 
accommodate regulatory and operational requirements.  Implementation of a FOQA 
program helps in identifying pilot deviations that may pose risk to flight safety.  These 
identifications provide possible operational trends and proactive solutions to mitigate 
risks.  In order to obtain full analyses of present deficiencies, airlines promote a positive 
safety reporting culture.  Through safety reports, crewmembers provide qualitative 
information that may aid in better understanding current deficiencies. 
TEM.  Identifying operational deficiencies and developing tailored training 
curricula are insufficient to meet operational requirements.  It is also important to 
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understand and assess operational threats and errors, as they mostly occur during critical 
flight phases, such as descent, approach, and landing.  TEM concludes CRM’s evolution 
to date; through the sixth generation culture has not been taken into account to 
accommodate cross-cultural crewmembers. 
Culture.  Wise et al. (2010) stated that culture influences CRM and affects its 
positive transfer to pilots.  CRM training does not involve cultural aspects (Wise et al., 
2010).  In their review, Helmreich and Merritt (2000) concluded that CRM is only a tool 
used to optimize operations and improve safety levels.  Additional studies have revealed 
that cross-culture can also impact pilots’ adaptation to aircraft automation and impede 
communication skills among diverse crewmembers (Helmreich, 2008; Solomon & 
Schell, 2009). 
Despite operating procedures set forth by the airlines, pilots with different 
cultures interact with aircraft automation in various ways.  Misuse and disuse of aircraft 
systems may lead to poor team coordination on the flight deck that may lead to degraded 
operational safety.  Such degradation of operational safety is not recognized by CRM. 
Communication skills can also present challenges among cross-cultural 
crewmembers.  Ineffective communication due to language diversity may lead to poor 
performance on the flight deck (Thomas, 2008).  Mental exhaustion, misunderstanding, 
and tension among crewmembers are all possible consequences of language diversity.  As 
a result, cross-cultural crewmembers tend to rely on SOP, checklists, and company 
policies without achieving a complete understanding amongst each other. 
CRM training must be culturally calibrated by understanding pilots’ attitudes, 
norms, and beliefs (Powell & Hill, 2006).  Three distinct, yet intertwined, types of 
  
76 
cultures influence airline operations: national, professional, and organizational cultures 
(Helmreich et al., 2001b).  Inside these cultures are certain traits and beliefs that 
influence pilots’ behaviors and attitudes, and which may jeopardize operational 
performance levels.  Understanding the aforementioned types of cultures and how they 
influence operational safety form the basis of a proactive approach toward a positive 
safety culture. 
Understanding the influence of national, professional, and organizational cultures 
on crewmembers is an important and complex task.  Neglecting the impact of these 
cultures may lead to degraded operational performance and organizational implications.  
Taking a proactive stance and recognizing the effects of cross-culture on operations is an 
initial step toward mitigating and managing the effects of cross-culture.  Air MENA is a 
cross-cultural organization with over 100 nationalities working together.  Achieving 
cultural coherency at Air MENA is an important step that must be initiated with a 
positive managerial interaction.  
  Cultural coherency may be achieved by re-establishing CRM concepts.  
Integrating cross-cultural ideologies in CRM training would result in universally accepted 
training programs and would include CCAAP training.  The addition of cross-cultural 
training would bridge the gaps among cross-cultural crewmembers to improve flight deck 
relations and flight operations.   
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
This chapter reviews the methodology utilized to analyze the relationship among 
pilot nationalities with respect to unsafe performance events related to Hard Landings, 
Unstable Approaches, and Pilot Deviations during various flight phases.  A review of the 
pilot population at Air MENA revealed a culturally diverse work force with a 
considerable number of nationalities working together.  Consequently, a detailed analysis 
of flight events was undertaken to examine the influence of culture combination of 
captain and first officer on performance.  Flight events from May 2011 to January 2013 
formed the basis of this study, which provided in-depth analysis of flight parameters, 
flight deviations, and pilots’ errors.   
Research Approach and Design 
The research design used for this study was an archival design utilizing existing 
organizational records (Vogt, Gardner, & Haettele, 2012).  A descriptive comparative 
method was adapted to analyze the relationship between unsafe performance events and 
captain / first officer nationality combinations during flights where performance events 
were recorded.  The flight data were retrieved from an unchanged flight data-recording 
environment yielding robust detailed data that was combined with administrative 
demographic data. 
Tests of associations were used to understand the relationship between unsafe 
performance events and nationality combinations.  Tests of associations were aimed at 
determining the nature and degree of relationships between variables (Black, 1999).  
These associations were illustrated through multi-dimensional chi-square tests.  A 
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comparison of cross-cultural and homogeneous flight deck crew combinations from 
unsafe performance events was examined.  Additional analyses were conducted to predict 
group membership through discriminant analysis and multinomial logistic regression. 
Several Spearman’s r correlation tests were conducted to assess the influence of 
intervening demographic variables on the association between nationality combinations 
and unsafe performance events.  While cause-and-effect relationships between variables 
could not be determined in this research design, association variations between variables 
were made evident.  
The data used in this study were flight data events gathered from Air MENA.  The 
unsafe performance events examined in this study were Hard Landings, Unstable 
Approaches, and Pilot Deviations that occurred during various flight phases.   
Population/Sample 
 The population for the study was unsafe performance events for Air MENA 
between May 2011 and January 2013.  These unsafe performance events were only pilot 
related events.  All other events were eliminated from the data set.  Purposive sampling 
ensured that data selection targeted crew based events that would aid in exploring the 
hypotheses (Babbie, 2010).  The population contained 1,863 unsafe performance events 
from a total of 1,149 pilots: 536 captains and 613 first officers.  The purposive sample 
contained 1,088 unsafe performance events that met the hypotheses: Harding Landings, 
Unstable Approaches, and Pilot Deviations and included 915 pilots: 428 captains and 487 
first officers.  
The Aerobytes program, a FDM software used at Air MENA, cannot determine 
whether several unsafe events took place on the same flight in the provided data.  
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Therefore, each unsafe performance event was allocated a unique event identification 
number and each event was treated as an independent incident for data analyses.  
Some events were performed by the same captain / first officer combination on 
different flights.  The data set contained 660 events (61%) with duplicated captain ID 
numbers; from the duplicated captain ID cases, less than 37% of captains were duplicated 
more than twice in the dataset.  For first officer, 601 events (55%) contained first officer 
ID number duplications, and from the duplicated first officer ID cases, less than 29% of 
first officers were duplicated more than twice in the dataset.  Figures 14 and 15 indicate 
the number of duplicated and un-duplicated unsafe performance events for captains and 
first officers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Number of duplicated and non-duplicated unsafe performance events by 
captains. 
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Figure 15. Number of duplicated and non-duplicated unsafe performance events by first 
officers. 
 
 
 All valid data on unsafe performance events were included; any corrupted data 
due to server inconsistencies were excluded.  All pilots in the study had completed at 
least one mandatory operator proficiency check, ensuring that both captains and first 
officers were current on Air MENA’s flight operating standards.  Therefore, any unsafe 
performance events were not due to inconsistent or insufficient training of pilots.   
The sample contained 97 different pilot nationalities.  To reduce the number of 
pilot nationality combinations used in the data analyses, pilot nationalities were classified 
into 7 continent categories: Africa, Asia / Pacific, Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS), Europe, Latin America / the Caribbean, Middle-East / North Africa (MENA), and 
North America (IATA, 2012).  Therefore, the number of captain / first officer 
nationalities (continents) combinations was reduced to 49.   
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Generalizability 
 While this study analyzed data gathered from one airline, it was crucial to assess 
its generalizability among other airlines in the MENA region.  Three components were 
reviewed to ensure the study’s generalizability: 
1. Data Collection: The software used to gather data, Aerobytes, is used by 11 
operators within the MENA region (Aerobytes, 2014). 
2. Pilot Nationalities: The shortage of pilots in the MENA region is a strong 
indicator of an international recruitment process.  According to Shaw-Smith 
(2013), Boeing estimates the need for 40,000 pilots in the MENA region between 
2013 and 2032.  The pilot training facilities in the region train approximately 130 
pilots per facility per year (Shaw-Smith, 2013).  This shortage is already 
reflecting on MENA operators; the second-largest airline operating out of Dubai 
International Airport has a work force from 85 countries (Gale, 2011). 
3. Fleet: According to Anna Aero (2013), three major airlines in the MENA region 
have a total fleet of 285 aircraft that consist of Airbus and Boeing aircraft. 
 Sources of the Data 
 Flight data events were recorded by the Aerobytes FDM program and gathered 
from the safety department at Air MENA.  The population data gathered included all 
unsafe performance events that were categorized by types of events and phases of events.  
The purposive sample of unsafe performance events included three categories to 
investigate the research hypotheses:  Hard Landings, Unstable Approaches, and Pilot 
Deviations.  Demographical data, such as age and nationality, were also collected from 
the administrative database of Air MENA.  The nationality combinations of captain and 
  
82 
first officer pilots in one event were the main predictor variables in the study, with unsafe 
performance events as the dependent variable.  
The entire data set were compiled from Air MENA.  In order to protect the 
identity of the pilots and the airline involved in the events, a thorough de-identification 
process was conducted.  Identifying information such as pilot names, staff numbers, 
flight number, and aircraft registrations were omitted from the data set.  The quantitative 
data included event name, departure airports, arrival airports, fleet, severity of the event, 
phase of the flight, pilots’ age, and nationalities of captains and first officers.   
Data Collection Device 
The FOQA information was gathered from Aerobytes, which is the FDM software 
used by Air MENA.  Quick Access Recorders and Flight Data Recorders are devices 
installed in every aircraft at Air MENA.  These recording devices process the incoming 
data and download the data to the safety department’s database via two methods (Flight 
Data Monitoring System, 2012): 
1. Automatically using Global System for Mobile (GSM) communications.  By 
securing a communication network between each aircraft and the server, flight 
data can be transmitted efficiently to the safety department.  This process 
occurs automatically after every landing.  
2. Manually using data collection cards. 
Pilots’ ages and nationalities were gathered from the Airline Information 
Management System (AIMS) database.  The researcher integrated Aerobytes and AIMS 
data; for each flight event, the pilots’ age and nationality were added.  The final data were 
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then converted to an Excel format and exported to Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences (SPSS) for data cleaning, recoding, and analysis. 
Measures 
The data set contained variables that identified unsafe performance events, such 
as type, phase, and severity, as illustrated in Appendix C - Table C2.  In order to remove 
non-pertinent undesirable flight events, data cleaning was performed on the data set, and 
the study’s variables were re-coded for analysis. For the purpose of the current study, the 
variables used in data analyses were as follows: 
1. Fleet Type: the aircraft type 
2. Departure Airport: name of airport for flight departure 
3. Destination Airport: name of arrival airport 
4. Flight Take-off Date 
5. Flight Arrival Date 
6. Status of the Event: indicating that the unsafe performance event is one of the 
unsafe performance events being studied and should be included in the data 
analyses.  Only valid events were included in the data analyses. 
7. Event Name: the name of unsafe performance events, such as abnormal sink 
rate, approach speed high, and deviation above glide slope. 
8. Type: of Unsafe Performance Event, such as Acceleration 
9. Phase: of incident, such as landing and approach 
10. Severity: of unsafe approach ranging from minor to major to critical 
11. Nationality of captain 
12. Nationality of first officer 
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13. Age of captain 
14. Age of first officer 
Treatment of the Data 
The data collected from the Aerobytes FDM program were categorical; therefore, 
variables were created for the nominal data.  The data were categorized and meaningful 
value labels were created.   
Cleaning and re-coding of the data took place prior to data analyses.  The data 
cleaning process began by eliminating all unsafe performance events that could not be 
categorized under one of the following unsafe performance events: Hard Landing, 
Unstable Approach, and Pilot Deviation.  For the purpose of this study, unsafe 
performance events pertaining to the following categories were eliminated from data 
analyses: Turbulence, Long Landing, Short Landing, Technical, Go Around, 
Performance, Windshear, GPWS, CFIT, and TCAS.  From a total of 1,863 unsafe 
performance events obtained from the Aerobytes FDM program, 775 events were 
excluded from data analyses and 1,088 events were included in the data analysis.  
The variable, unsafe performance events, was categorized as: Hard Landings = 1, 
Unstable Approaches = 2, and Pilot Deviation = 3.  Appendix C - Table C3 displays the 
unsafe performance events classified into the three events categories.   
The sample was divided by rank: captain or first officer.  The captain and first 
officer nationalities were recoded into one of the seven continents: 1 = Africa,  
2 = Asia / Pacific, 3 = CIS, 4 = Europe, 5 = Latin America / the Caribbean, 6 = MENA, 
and 7 = North America.  Appendix C - Table C4 displays a breakdown of nationalities 
within continent.  For testing the research hypotheses, 49 nationality continent 
  
85 
combinations between captain and first officer were generated in SPSS; there are seven 
continent nationalities for captains and seven continent nationalities for first officers.  
The 7 by 7 continent nationality combinations were used in chi-square analyses.   
The continent nationality combinations included cross-cultural and homogeneous 
combinations, which were generated using 49 dummy variables in SPSS.  When the 
nationality combination was true, the value was coded as 1 = yes; when the nationality 
combination was false, the value was coded as 0 = no.  For example:  nationality 
combination 1 was captain = Africa and first officer = Africa or nationality combination 
2 was captain = Africa and first officer = Asia / Pacific. 
In addition, a dichotomous variable ‘nationality combination type’ was generated 
to differentiate between the homogeneous nationality combinations and the 
heterogeneous cross-cultural nationality combinations of captain / first officer.  For the 
seven homogeneous continent nationality combinations, such as Africa_ Africa, a value 
of 1 was assigned.  For the 42 heterogeneous cross-cultural nationality combinations, a 
value of 2 was assigned. 
The ratio variable, number of unsafe performance events committed per 
(continent) nationality combination of captain / first officer, was created.  The total 
number of unsafe performance events was calculated for each of the (continent) 
nationality combinations.  For example, the total number of unsafe performance events 
committed by the nationality combination of captain / first officer listed, such as 
Africa_Africa and Africa_CIS.  This ratio was used in the analyses to show the 
nationality combination that had the largest ratio of unsafe performance events; 
descriptive data were used to identify which specific country nationality combination of 
  
86 
captain / first officer committed most / least unsafe performance events, such as 
British_Africa. 
Age of captains / first officers (measured in years) was a continuous variable and 
analyses were conducted to determine the association of age with unsafe performance 
events to identify its influence on the overall findings on nationality combinations.  
Additional recoding of the continuous variable age was conducted to determine which, if 
any, specific age category of captains / first officers was an intervening variable to the 
association between nationality combination and unsafe performance events.  A 
categorical variable was generated for age that had three levels: younger age, average 
age, and older age.  The average age category accounted for 68% and was created as the 
mean plus or minus one standard deviation.  The younger age category included pilots 
whose age was less than 1 standard deviation from the mean, representing 16% of the 
sample.  The older age category included pilots whose age was greater than 1 standard 
deviation above the mean, representing 16% of the sample.   
Other variables used in data analyses were categorically recoded.  Re-coding of 
the following nominal data is illustrated in Appendix C - Tables C2: fleet type, departure 
airport, event name, type, severity, and phase. 
Destination airports and eligibility to command the flight were included in the 
analyses to eliminate their influence on the associations between nationality combinations 
of captain / first officer and unsafe performance events.  There were 87 different 
destination airports in the dataset, coded from 1 to 87.  Destination airports are 
categorized as illustrated in Appendix C - Table C5.  Based on the destination airports 
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recorded in the dataset, the eligibility of captain and first officer to command variable 
was created (Operations Manual Part A, 2012b). 
1. Category A: Captains or first officers are eligible to command the flight; the 
category includes 52 airport destinations.  Airports under Category A must 
satisfy all of the following requirements: 
 An approved instrument approach procedure; 
 At least one runway with no performance limited procedure for takeoff 
and / or landing; 
 Published circling minima not higher than 1,000ft above aerodrome level 
(AAL); and 
 Night operations capability. 
2. Category B: Only captains are eligible to command the flight; the category 
includes 31 airport destinations.  Airports under Category B do not satisfy the 
Category A requirements or require considerations such as: 
 Non-standard approach aids and or approach patterns; 
 Unusual local weather conditions; 
 Unusual characteristics or performance limitations; and 
 Any other relevant considerations including obstructions, physical layout, 
and lighting. 
3. Category C: Only captains are eligible to command the flight and first officers 
must have received the same simulator training; the category includes four 
airports.  Prior to operating to Category C airports, the captain must visit the 
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aerodromes as an observer and / or undertake instructions in a flight simulator.  
The operator should certify this instruction. 
Assumption Checks.  Assumption checks were performed on all of the variables 
in the data set to ensure that the data are not problematic for further data analyses.  The 
data are nominal data; therefore, assumption checks for normal distribution and linearity 
of the data are not necessary.  The following assumption checks were conducted: 
1. Sample size was appropriate for the data analyses conducted in the study.  The 
sample size was greater than 50 participants and is more than 8 times the number 
of independent variables (Brace, Kemp, & Snelgar, 2009).  
2. Homoscedasticity: This assumption was not violated as indicated in the Normal 
P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual graph shown in Appendix D - 
Figure D1.  As shown in the graph, the data was normally distributed.  The Scatter 
plot shown in Appendix D - Figure D2 also indicated that this assumption was not 
violated, as there was pattern to the data.  
3. Multicollinearity: This assumption was not violated as a linear relationship in the 
dependent variable was not indicated by the VIF Collinearity Statistics, where 
VIF level for all variables were less than 4.  The table of coefficients is illustrated 
in    Appendix C - Table C6.  
4. Outliers: This assumption is not violated and it appears that 3.5% of the records 
are outliers.  The Casewise Diagnostics Table in Appendix C - Table C7 shows 
that 96.5% of the records lie within 2 standard deviations above or below the 
mean.  The remaining 3.5% of the records are considered outliers, because they 
are above 2 standard deviations.  According to Rovai, Baker, and Ponton (2012), 
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since outliers are less than 5% of the data, they do not need to be removed from 
the data set, as they do not have an impact on the overall analysis. 
5. The data met the criteria for conducting the chi-square test in that the variables 
were measured on a nominal level of measurement.  Data were collected on more 
than two variables, the categorization of each of the variables was mutually 
exclusive, and every observation was independent of every other observation 
(Brace et al., 2009).  The chi-square assumption that less than 20% of the cases 
have to have an expected frequency of less than 5 has been met by the data.  The 
chi-square was useful as it calculated the expected frequencies for each data cell 
and compared the expected frequencies with observed frequencies (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2001).  If the observed and expected frequencies were shown to be 
significantly different then, the results would show that the distributions of 
observations across the data cells were not due to randomness, but that there was 
a significant difference between nationality groups on unsafe performance.  Given 
that existing variables were measured and not manipulated, a causal relationship 
between unsafe performance events and nationality combination could not be 
determined; instead only an association between the frequencies of groups could 
be established. 
Therefore, the data met the criteria to conduct the descriptive and inferential 
statistical tests.  These tests are discussed in the following sections.  Assumption checks 
for the different descriptive and inferential tests are addressed and outlined below in the 
data analyses section. 
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Descriptive Statistics.  Descriptive statistics were calculated to summarize the 
data in this study, providing an overview and understanding of what the data outcomes 
were as a whole.  For nominal data, it is meaningless to calculate all measures of central 
tendency and variability; the data were not measured on a scale but rather in categories 
(Howitt & Cramer, 2011).  Instead, descriptive analyses were restricted to reporting the 
mode, frequencies, and range.   
Inferential Statistics.  Inferential data analyses consisted of two parts.  First, data 
analyses were performed to determine the effects of intervening variables on unsafe 
performance events using tests of correlations.  Second, data analyses were conducted to 
answer the research hypotheses regarding the relationship between nationality 
combinations of captains / first officers and unsafe performance events.   
Research Question and Hypotheses Testing.  This study sought to answer the 
following research question: To what extent can we predict an unsafe performance event 
based on the nationality combination of pilots?  In order to answer this question, six 
hypotheses were investigated.  The purpose of hypothesis testing in research is to 
determine the likelihood that a population parameter is true.  
H1.  The null hypothesis was that there was no significant effect of the covariate 
age on the relationship between nationality combinations of captains / first officers and 
unsafe performance events.  In order to determine the degree of relationship between 
unsafe performance events and age, a Spearman’s r test was conducted.  This test 
provided the measure of strength and direction of any potential relationships between 
unsafe performance events and these intervening variables.  The Spearman’s r correlation 
test was ideal for non-parametric variables (Brace et al., 2009).  In addition, an 
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ANCOVA statistical test was conducted to control for the effect of age of captains / first 
officers on the relationship between nationality combination and unsafe performance 
events using the scaled variable, number of unsafe performance events per (continent) 
nationality combination, and unsafe performance event (Hard Landings, Unstable 
Approaches, and Pilot Deviation).   
H2.  The null hypothesis was that there was no significant effect of the covariate 
airport destination on the relationship between nationality combinations of captains / first 
officers and unsafe performance events.  In order to determine the degree of relationship 
between unsafe performance events and destination airport, a Spearman’s r test was 
conducted.  In addition, an ANCOVA statistical test was conducted to control for the 
effect of airport destination on the relationship between nationality combination and 
unsafe performance events using the scaled variable, number of unsafe performance 
events per (continent) nationality combination, and unsafe performance event (Hard 
Landings, Unstable Approaches, and Pilot Deviation.   
H3.  The null hypothesis was that there was no significant effect of the covariate 
eligibility to command the flight on the relationship between nationality combinations of 
captains / first officers and unsafe performance events.  In order to determine the degree 
of relationship between unsafe performance events and eligibility to command the flight, 
a Spearman’s r test was conducted.  In addition, an ANCOVA statistical test was 
conducted to control for the effect of eligibility to command the flight on the relationship 
between nationality combination and unsafe performance events using the scaled 
variable, number of unsafe performance events per (continent) nationality combination, 
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and unsafe performance event (Hard Landings, Unstable Approaches, and Pilot 
Deviation).   
H4.  The null hypothesis was that there was no significant association between the 
frequency of homogeneous and the heterogeneous cross-cultural nationality combinations 
of captains / first officers on unsafe performance events.  The association between 
nationality combinations of captains / first officers and unsafe performance events was 
investigated through a 2 by 3 multi-dimensional chi-square statistical test.  The aim was 
to check whether the frequency of homogeneous nationality combinations differed from 
the frequency of heterogeneous cross-cultural nationality combinations of captains/first 
officers on unsafe performance events.  
 In SPSS, the type of nationality combination was coded as: 1 = homogeneous and 
2 = heterogeneous.  Unsafe performance events were coded as follows: 1 = Hard 
Landings, 2 = Unstable Approaches, and 3 = Pilot Deviation.  The chi-square test was 
ideal for nominal data as it analyzed frequencies.  The results on the chi-square alone 
could not explain the pattern of the results nor could they determine group membership.  
The unstandardized residuals provided insight for which combinations contribute to the 
over chi-square results.   
H5.  The null hypothesis was that there was no significant association between the 
frequency of the nationality combinations of captains / first officers on unsafe 
performance events.  Using the 7 continent nationality combinations of captain and of 
first officer a 7 by 7 multi-dimensional chi-square was conducted.   
H6.  The null hypothesis was that there was no significant association between 
cross-cultural (pilot nationality) group memberships on unsafe performance events.  
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Discriminant analysis was used to predict category membership from the nationality 
combinations.  This analysis was used to predict which of the 49 nationality combination 
categories were more likely to commit unsafe performance events. 
Discriminant analysis was useful because it could be used in an attempt to predict 
category membership (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).  The analysis looks to find the effect 
of the Independent Variable (IV) on the Dependent Variable (DV) and in finding a 
significant effect of one of the IVs then a partial prediction of participants DV could be 
made.  In this case, discriminant analysis was used to predict which nationality 
combination membership was likely to commit an unsafe performance event. 
In addition, a multinomial logistic regression was used to analyze relationships 
between a non-metric dependent variable and a dichotomous independent variable 
(Pampel, 2000).  Multinomial logistic regression compared multiple groups through a 
combination of binary logistic regressions.  The group comparisons were equivalent to 
the comparisons for a dummy-coded dependent variable.  
A multinomial logistic regression was performed to identify which nationality 
combinations predicted unsafe performance events categories, an ideal test for nominal 
data.  The main function of the regression was (a) to describe the relationship between 
nationality combinations and unsafe performance categories, and (b) to identify which 
combinations best predicted an unsafe performance outcome.  As with the Discriminant 
Analysis, the 49 nationality combinations of captain and first officer were used as 
predictor variables, with the unsafe performance events categories as the dependent 
variable. 
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This statistical technique was useful as it computed the probability that pilots 
were a member of one of the three groups: Hard Landings, Unstable Approaches, or Pilot 
Deviation.  This approach indicated the probability that a particular nationality 
combination had or had not committed an unsafe performance event on the flight.  In 
SPSS, predicted group membership was compared to actual group membership to obtain 
a measure of classification accuracy (Brace et al., 2009). 
The data used in this research fulfilled the requirements needed to conduct this 
statistical test, as multinomial logistic regression analysis requires that the dependent 
variable be non-metric; that is, nominal or dichotomous variables.  The analysis also 
required that the IV be metric or dichotomous (Howitt & Cramer, 2011).  Multinomial 
logistic regression does not make any assumptions of linearity, homogeneity of variance, 
and normality for the independent variables.  In an event where the data does not satisfy 
these assumptions, this technique was preferred over discriminant analysis in order to 
predict group membership (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). 
In SPSS, the overall test of relationship among the independent and dependent 
variables was based on the reduction in the likelihood values for a model that does and 
one that does not contain any independent variables.  This technique was an extension of 
the chi-square analyses.  Multinomial logistic regression is often referred to as a          
chi-square model, as it follows chi-square distribution (Hosmer, Lemeshow, & 
Sturdivant, 2013).  The level of significance in the final chi-square model presented 
provides the evidence for the presence of a relationship between the different nationality 
combinations and the type of unsafe performance events.   
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While multinomial logistic regression indicated the strength of the relationship 
between IV and DV, the associations presented do not show the accuracy or errors 
associated with the chi-square model (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).  The benchmark that 
was used to characterize a multinomial logistic regression model as useful was 25% 
improvement over the rate of accuracy achievable by chance alone (Pampel, 2000). 
Summary 
 This research study analyzed the extent to which unsafe performance events can 
be predicted based upon pilot nationalities operating at a Middle Eastern airline.  Six null 
hypotheses involving various operational conditions were investigated by using different 
statistical methods.  Although the data were gathered from a single airline, the 
generalizability of the study was confirmed by reviewing the type of operations at other 
airlines in the region. 
 Aerobytes, a flight monitoring software used by Air MENA, was the source of 
data.  Data collection was restricted for flight events between May 2011 and January 
2013.  This restriction was due to the validity of the data available during the collection 
period.  
 A descriptive comparative method was adapted to analyze the relationship 
between the combination of pilot nationalities and unsafe performance events.  The study 
included 1,088 unsafe performance events and 915 pilots from 97 nationalities.  Due to 
the complexity of the gathered data, pilot nationalities were coded into 7 continents: 
Africa, Asia / Pacific, CIS, Europe, Latin America / the Caribbean, MENA, and  
North America.  Additional codes were generated to create categories for other variables, 
such as destination airports, fleet, and unsafe performance events. 
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 Several statistical tests were used to analyze the null hypotheses.  An ANCOVA 
was used to test for three covariates: pilots’ age, airport destination, and eligibility to 
command the flight.  The ANCOVA tests were an important phase as they reviewed the 
effect of the aforementioned covariates on the relationship between nationality 
combinations and unsafe performance events.  In addition to ANCOVA, a Spearman’s r 
test was used to test for the relationship between the covariates and unsafe performance 
events. 
  A 2 by 3 multi-dimensional chi-square statistical test was used to analyze the 
association between the frequency of homogeneous and heterogeneous cross-cultural 
nationality combinations.  In order to test for the association between the frequencies of 
the nationality combinations of captains / first officers on unsafe performance events a 
7 by 7 multi-dimensional chi-square statistical test was conducted.  And finally, a 
discriminant analysis and logistic regression were utilized to test the association between 
cross-cultural (pilot nationality) group memberships on unsafe performance events. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
This study explored the relationship between nationality combinations of captains 
and first officers and unsafe performance events.  The nationality combinations of pilots 
(continent combinations) at Air MENA were used in data analyses to determine the 
frequency of unsafe performance events (Hard Landings, Unstable Approaches, and Pilot 
Deviations) committed.  The associations, and group membership with regard to these 
variables were explored, and confounding factors were investigated.  
Descriptive Statistics 
Flight data events were recorded by the Aerobytes FDM program and gathered 
from the safety department at Air MENA.  The majority of events in the dataset had 
flights that had departed from or had their last destination as the Hub airport; 60% of 
flights were departures from the Hub, 37% of the flights were arrivals to the Hub.   
Unsafe Performance Events.  From a total of 1,088 unsafe performance events, 
there were a total of 13 Hard Landing incidents, 286 Unstable Approaches incidents, and 
789 Pilot Deviation incidents.  Unsafe performance events occurred in three flight 
phases: ‘Air’ (47%),  ‘Landing & Approach’ (42%), and Ground (11%).  All 13 Hard 
Landings occurred in the Landing & Approach phase of flight.  Figure 16 indicates the 
type of unsafe performance for ‘Unstable Approach’ events.  As shown, the most 
common type of event was ‘Late land flap (height AAL)’ (22%), followed by ‘Approach 
Speed High (<500ft)’ (16%) and ‘High rate of descent (<1000ft)’ (13%).  
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Figure 16. Frequency of unsafe performance events type for unstable approaches. 
 
Figure 17 indicates the type of unsafe performance events for ‘Pilot Deviation.’   
The most common type of event was ‘Dual Side Stick Input (Pitch)’ (29%), followed by 
‘High-speed Below 5,000’ on Descent’ (9%) and ‘Dual Side Stick Input (Roll)’ (7%). 
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Figure 17. Frequency of unsafe performance events type for pilot deviations.  
 
Events by Aircraft Type. The aircraft type where most unsafe performance 
events were committed was A320 (50%), of which 80% of these events were Pilot 
Deviation.  The A330 had 28.1% of all unsafe performance events followed by the A340 
(13.1%) and then the B777 (8%), as illustrated in Table 3. 
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Table 3  
Unsafe Performance Events by Aircraft Type 
Aircraft Type 
Event Name  
 Total 
Hard 
Landings 
Unstable 
Approaches 
Pilot 
Deviation 
A320 3 106 435 544 
A330 7    96 211 314 
A340 1    34 108 143 
B777 2    50   35   87 
Total         13 286   789 1088 
 
Hard landing events were committed on A330 (53.85%), A320 (23.07%), 
B777 (15.38%) and A340 (7.70%).  For unstable approaches 37.1% of events were 
committed on the A320, 31.8% were committed on the A330, 17.5% were committed on 
the B777, and 13.6% were committed on the A340.  For pilot deviation, 55.1% of the 
pilot deviations were committed on the A320, 26.4% were committed on the A330, 
13.7% were committed on the A340, and 4.8% were committed on the B777. 
Events by Severity.  Figure 18 and Table 4 indicate the severity and type of 
events grouped into unsafe performance categories.  The most frequent severity was 
Major (58.82%), followed by Critical (35.57%), and Minor (5.61%).  The highest 
percentages of unsafe performance events were: 37.8% were pilot deviations of major 
severity, 32.0% were pilot deviations of critical severity, 19.9% were unstable 
approaches of major severity, 3.6% were unstable approaches of critical severity, 2.8% 
were unstable approaches of minor severity, and 1.2% were hard landings of major 
severity. 
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Figure 18.  Frequency and severity levels of unsafe performance events. 
 
 
Table 4  
 
Type of Event by Severity Level 
 
Type of 
Event 
Severity of Event  
 
 Minor Major Critical Total 
Speed 38 196 60 294 
Acceleration 0 13 0 13 
Flight Path 8 130 19 157 
Attitude 13 36 33 82 
Power 1 8 0 9 
Configuration 1 170 53 224 
Warnings 0 87 222 309 
Total 61 640 387 1088 
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Events by Airport.  Hard Landing events occurred mostly at Amman airport 
(15.38%) and Kathmandu airport (15.38%) as the final destination airport; the remaining 
69.24% of Hard Landing events occurred at Addis Ababa, Adelaide, Brisbane, Geneva, 
Hong Kong, Istanbul, Lahore, Shanghai, and Riyadh (7.69% each).  The Hub airport 
accounted for 20.6% of the unstable approaches.  The top five airports with the most 
unstable approaches, excluding the Hub airport, are: Seychelles (17%), Damascus (12%), 
John F. Kennedy (10%), Amman (7%), and Khartoum (6%).  The Hub airport also 
accounted for 43.09% of the pilot deviations.  The top five airports with the most pilot 
deviations, excluding the Hub airport, are: Kuwait and Lahore (22% each), Muscat 
(19%), Amman (18%), and Doha (17%). 
Nationalities.  The sample’s demographics are split into nationalities.  The 
captains’ nationalities were from: 
 Europe (38.14%),  
o British (8.64%), German (6.16%), French (5.33%), Italian 
(4.32%), Irish (1.84%), Greek (1.38%), Belgian and Cypriot 
(1.19% each), Austrian, Swiss, and Turkish (1.1% each), Croatian 
(0.92%), Spanish and Swedish (0.74% each), Bulgarian, 
Hungarian, Maltese, and Serbian & Montenegrin (0.46% each), 
Bosnian & Herzegovina (0.28%), and Dutch, Slovenian, and 
Yugoslavian (0.09% each).    
 Asia / Pacific (21.42%),  
Malaysian (7.9%), Indian (2.11%), New Zealander (1.84%), South 
Korean (1.64%), Filipino (1.6%), Sri Lankan (1.2%), Singaporean 
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(0.83%), Australian and Pakistani (0.73% each), Papua New 
Guinean and Taiwanese (0.64% each), Chinese and Thai 
(0.36% each), Bangladeshi and Bruneian (0.28% each), Indonesian 
(0.18%), and New Caledonia (0.1%). 
 Middle-east & North Africa (15.81%),  
o Egyptian (3.58%), Emirati (3.13%), Jordanian and Omani (1.65% 
each), Tunisian (1.01%), Iraqi and Kuwaiti (0.83% each), Bahraini 
(0.74%), Algerian and Syrian (0.64% each), Moroccan (0.46%), 
Sudanese (0.37%), and Lebanese (0.28%). 
 Latin America & the Caribbean (13.60%),  
o Mexican (2.39%), Peruvian (1.84%), Brazilian (1.75%), Jamaican 
and Salvadoran (1.65% each), Trinidadian & Tobago (1.56%), 
Costa Rican (0.83%), Chilean and Colombian (0.46% each), 
Bolivian and Venezuelan (0.37% each), and Guatemalan (0.27%).  
 Africa (4.87%),  
o South African (1.56%), Seychellois (1.1%), Ethiopian (0.74%), 
Ugandan (0.55%), Mozambican (0.37%), Zimbabwe (0.28%), 
Kenyan (0.18%), and Motswana Plural Bats (0.09%). 
 North America (5.33%), and 
o Canadian (3.4%), and American (1.93%). 
 CIS (0.83%).   
o Moldovan (0.55%), Ukrainian (0.18%), and Russian (0.10%). 
 
  
104 
 
The First Officers’ nationalities were from:   
 Europe (34.72%),  
o British (7.74%), Spanish (6.08%), Italian (5.06%), Greek (3.68%), 
French (2.4%), Irish (1.57%), Hungarian (1.2%), Romanian 
(1.11%), Cypriot and Dutch (0.83% each), German (0.74%), 
Swedish (0.65%), Danish and Maltese (0.54% each), Belgian 
(0.46%), Turkish (0.37%), Finish and Portuguese (0.28% each), 
Slovakian (0.18%), and Bulgarian and Swiss (0.09% each). 
 Asia / Pacific (22.84%),  
o Thai (3.41%), Malaysian (3.32%), Australian (2.77%), Pakistani 
(2.12%), Taiwanese (1.75%), Indian (1.57%), Sri Lankan, New 
Zealander, and Filipino (1.38% each), South Korean (1.1%), 
Singaporean (1.01%), Bangladeshi (0.46%), Bhutanese and 
Indonesian (0.28% each), Maldivian, Nepalese, and               
French Polynesian (0.18% each), and Papua New Guinean 
(0.09%). 
 Middle-east & North Africa (27.07%),  
o Emirati (23.94%), Egyptian (0.65% each), Moroccan (0.55%), 
Lebanese (0.46%), Qatari (0.37%), Saudi Arabian and Sudanese 
(0.28% each), Tunisian (0.18%), and Algerian, Jordanian, Syrian, 
and Yemeni (0.09% each). 
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 Latin America & the Caribbean (8.83%),  
o Mexican (3.32%), Brazilian (1.66%), Jamaican (0.91%), 
Trinidadian & Tobago (0.74%), Salvadoran (0.65%), Colombian 
(0.55%), Peruvian (0.37%), Argentinean, Dominican, and 
Venezuelan (0.18% each), and Chilean (0.09%). 
 Africa (4.14%), and 
o South African (1.93%), Seychellois (1.29%), Cote d Lvoire, 
Ethiopian, Mauritian, and Senegalese (0.18% each), and Malian 
and Uganda (0.10% each). 
 North America (2.4%). 
o American (2.12%), and Canadian (0.28%),  
As illustrated in Figure 19, the top 10 nationality combinations for 
Captain_First Officer (grouped into continents) is Europe_Europe (14%), followed by 
Europe_Middle-east & North Africa (10%).  
 
 
 
Figure 19. Top 10 nationality combinations for Captain_First Officer. 
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Table 5 indicates the descriptive information for nationality combinations, 
including the percent.  No nationality combinations between captain and first officer 
existed for the following combinations: Africa_CIS, Asia / Pacific_CIS, CIS_Africa, 
CIS_CIS, CIS_Latin America & the Caribbean, CIS_North America, Europe_CIS, Latin 
America & the Caribbean_CIS, Middle-east & North Africa_CIS, North America_ CIS, 
and North America_North America. 
 
Table 5  
 
Distribution Among Pilot Nationality Combinations 
  
 
Captain Nationality Combinations 
First Officer 
Nationality 
Combinations 
Africa 
Asia / 
Pacific 
CIS Europe 
Latin 
America 
& the 
Caribbean 
MENA 
North 
America 
Total 
Africa 0.3% 1.1% --- 1.7% 0.5% 0.2% 0.5% 4.2% 
Asia / Pacific 
 
1.3% 6.5% 0.1% 7.6% 2.8% 3.1% 1.5% 22.8% 
CIS --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Europe 1.8% 6.9% 0.2% 14.0% 4.8% 5.3% 1.7% 34.7% 
Latin 
America & 
the Caribbean 
 
0.3% 1.8% --- 3.0% 1.4% 1.1% 0.4% 8.8% 
MENA 1.7% 3.7% 0.6% 10.3% 4.1% 5.2% 1.4% 27.0% 
North 
America 
 
0.1% 1.2% --- 0.7% 0.1% 0.3% --- 2.4% 
Total 5.5% 21.3% 0.8% 38.2% 13.6% 15.2% 5.3% 100% 
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Pilots’ Age.  The age range for captains was between 29 and 64 years of age 
(mean age = 47, median and mode = 46, S.D. = 7.4).  First officers’ age ranged between 
21 and 61 years (mean age = 36, median = 35, mode = 29, S.D. = 8).  Three age 
categories were generated for both captains and first officers: younger age, average age, 
and older age.  The average age category was created as the mean plus or minus one 
standard deviation.  The younger age category included pilots whose age was less than 1 
standard deviation below the mean, and the older age category included pilots whose age 
was greater than 1 standard deviation above the mean.  Table 6 illustrates the frequency 
of age groups for captains (39 years and under, 40-54 years, and 55 years and over) and 
for first officers (28 years and under, 29-44 years, and 45 years and above). 
 
Table 6   
 
Frequency of Age Categories 
 
Captains’ Age Categories Frequency Percent 
 
39 Years and under 192 17.6 
40-54 Years 713 65.5 
55 Years and over 183 16.8 
Total 1088 100.0 
    
First Officers’ Age Categories               Frequency Percent  
 28 Years and under 221 20.3 
 29-44 Years 705 64.8 
 45 Years and above 162 14.9 
 Total 1088 100.0 
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Nationality Combinations and Unsafe Performance Events 
All Hard Landing events were due to ‘Abnormal Vertical G with Flap.’  Table 7 
indicates the nationality combination of Captain_First Officer for ‘Hard Landing’ events.  
For Unstable Approach events, as indicated in Figure 20, the nationality combination 
with the largest percentage was Europe_Europe (13.64%); followed by the nationality 
combination of Europe_Middle-East & North Africa (9.44%), Europe_Asia/Pacific 
(9.44%), and Asia / Pacific_Europe (9.10%). 
 
Table 7   
Frequency of Hard Landing Events by Nationality combinations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nationality Combination (Continent) 
Frequency of 
Events 
Percentage 
Latin America & the Caribbean_Europe 3 23.08 
Asia/Pacific_ Asia/Pacific 2 15.38 
Europe_Europe 2 15.38 
Europe_Middle-east & North Africa 2 15.38 
Africa_Europe 1 7.69 
Europe_Asia/Pacific 1 7.69 
Europe_Latin America & the Caribbean 1 7.69 
Middle-east & North Africa_Africa 1 7.69 
Total 13 100.00 
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Figure 20. Frequency of unstable approaches for pilots nationality combinations.  
 
 
 
Moreover, Figure 21 indicates that the most common nationality combination for 
Captain_First Officer where unsafe performance events took place for the Pilot Deviation 
events was Europe_Europe (14%); followed by ‘Europe_Middle-east & North Africa’ 
(11%) and ‘Europe_Asia /Pacific’ (7%). 
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Figure 21. Frequency of pilot deviations for pilots nationality combinations.  
 
Inferential Statistics 
Hypothesis 1.  The null hypothesis was that there was no significant effect of the 
covariate age on the relationship between nationality combinations of captains / first 
officers and unsafe performance events. A Spearman’s rank correlation and an ANCOVA 
statistical test were conducted to test hypothesis 1. 
A Spearman’s rank correlation test was employed on the full dataset to determine 
the degree of relationship between unsafe performance events (Hard Landings, Unstable 
Approaches and Pilot Deviation) and age (three age categories) to test the null 
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hypothesis. The findings showed that there was not a significant correlation between 
unsafe performance events and age of captains: rs(1088) = -.013, p = .665, where 
rs
2 = .000169.  Therefore, the null hypothesis failed to be rejected.  However, the findings 
showed that there was a significant but very weak correlation between unsafe 
performance events and age of first officers: rs(1088) = -.09,   p = .003, where rs
2 = .0081. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. 
A between subjects ANCOVA was conducted on the full dataset to investigate the 
effect of nationality type (homogeneous or heterogeneous) on unsafe performance events 
while controlling for the variable: age of pilots.  Prior to conducting the ANCOVA test, 
the following assumption checks were made (Brace et al., 2009): 
1. A covariate should be chosen on the basis of existing theory and research. 
2. A covariate should ideally be measured using a scale at ratio, interval, or 
ordinal level (if nominal, then the variable has to be a dichotomous variable). 
3. Ideally, a covariate should be measured before the experimental manipulation 
takes place. 
4. A covariate should be measured reliably. 
5. The relationship between a covariate and the dependent variable must be 
linear. 
6. There should be homogeneity of regression. 
The findings showed that the data violated the homogeneity of regression 
assumption for first officers’ age, F(1, 1082) = 12.405, p < .000. Therefore, the 
ANCOVA was not conducted. 
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Hypothesis 2.  The null hypothesis was that there was no significant effect of the 
covariate airport destination on the relationship between nationality combinations of 
captains / first officers and unsafe performance events.  A Spearman’s rank correlation 
and an ANCOVA statistical tests were conducted. 
A Spearman’s rank correlation test was employed to determine the degree of 
relationship between unsafe performance events (Hard Landings, Unstable Approaches, 
and Pilot Deviation) and destination airport.  The variable destination airport was recoded 
into a dichotomous variable where the Hub was recoded to 1 and all other destination 
airports were recoded to 0. This recoding enabled the data to meet the assumption checks.  
The Hub airport was 36.67% of the total number of destination airports.  The findings 
showed that there was a significant weak correlation between destination airport and 
unsafe performance events rs(1088)  = .219, p < 0.001, where rs
2 = .048.  Therefore, the 
null hypothesis was rejected. Table 8 lists the frequency of unsafe performance events at 
the Hub airport versus spoke airports. 
 
Table 8  
Airport Destination by Unsafe Performance Event 
 Event Name 
Destination 
Hard 
Landings 
Unstable 
Approaches 
Pilot 
Deviation 
Total 
Spoke Destinations 13 227 449 689 
Hub  0 59 340 399 
Total 13 286 789 1088 
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A between subjects ANCOVA was conducted to investigate the effect of 
nationality type (homogeneous or heterogeneous) on unsafe performance events while 
controlling for the variable: destination airport (dichotomous variable).  The findings 
showed that there was not a significant difference between unsafe performance events 
and nationality combinations when taking airport destination into account, 
F(1, 1083) = 2.76, p = .097.  The null hypothesis failed to be rejected; therefore, there 
was no difference between unsafe performance events and nationality combinations when 
taking airport destination into account. 
Hypothesis 3.  The null hypothesis was there was no significant effect of the 
covariate eligibility to command the flight on the relationship between nationality 
combinations of captains / first officers and unsafe performance events.  A Spearman’s 
rank correlation and an ANCOVA statistical test were conducted. 
A Spearman’s rank correlation test was employed to determine the degree of 
relationship between unsafe performance events (Hard Landings, Unstable Approaches, 
and Pilot Deviation) and eligibility to command the flight.  There was a significant weak 
correlation between eligibility to command the flight and unsafe performance events 
rs(1088) = -.304, p  < 0.001, where rs
2 = .092.  Therefore, the null hypothesis was 
rejected.  Table 9 provides a distribution by event name for pilots’ eligibility to land at 
the destination airport. 
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Table 9  
Eligibility of Pilot to Land at Destination Airport 
Eligibility of Pilot to Land at 
Destination Airport 
Event Name 
Hard 
Landings 
Unstable 
Approaches 
Pilot 
Deviation 
Total 
Captain or First Officer 6 156 654 816 
Only Captain 4 98 115 217 
Only Captain with Trained First Officer 3 32 20 55 
Total 13 286 789 1088 
 
A between subjects ANCOVA was conducted to investigate the effect of 
nationality type (homogeneous or heterogeneous) on unsafe performance events while 
controlling for the variable: eligibility to command the flight.  The findings showed that 
the data did violate the assumption check of homogeneity of regression as the interaction 
between the dependent variable unsafe performance event and the covariate eligibility to 
command the flight significantly interacted F(1, 1082) = 108.31, p < .000. Therefore, the 
ANCOVA was not conducted.   
Hypothesis 4.  The null hypothesis was that there was no significant association 
between the frequency of homogeneous and the heterogeneous cross-cultural nationality 
combinations of captains / first officers on unsafe performance events.  A 2 by 3      
multi-dimensional chi-square test was employed on the full dataset to investigate whether 
there was an association between nationality combination type (homogeneous or 
heterogeneous) of captains / first officers and unsafe performance events.  There was no 
significant association between nationality combination type and unsafe performance 
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events, χ2 = 3.032, df = 2, p = 0.22.  Therefore, the null hypothesis failed to be rejected, as 
shown in Table 10. 
 
Table 10  
Nationality Combinations by Unsafe Performance Events 
 Event Name 
Nationality Combinations 
Hard 
Landings 
Unstable 
Approaches 
Pilot 
Deviation 
Total 
Heterogeneous 9 219 561 789 
Homogeneous 4 67 226 297 
Total 13 286 787 1086 
 
Hypothesis 5.  The null hypothesis was that there was no significant association 
between the frequencies of the nationality combinations of captains / first officers on 
unsafe performance events.  A 7 by 7 multi-dimensional chi-square test was conducted to 
investigate which nationality combinations were associated with each unsafe 
performance events category.  The chi-square results were: 
 Hard landings: χ2 = 24.27, df = 16, p = .084, failed to reject the null 
hypothesis, 
 Unstable approaches: χ2 = 27.71, df = 30, p = .586, failed to reject the null 
hypothesis, 
 Pilot deviations: χ2 = 58.72, df = 30, p = .001, rejected the null hypothesis, 
and 
 Total: χ2 = 54.12, df = 30, p = .004, rejected the null hypothesis. 
The unstandardized residuals provided below indicate the pilots’ nationality 
combinations that most contributed to the chi-square result: 
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 Hard landings 
o Captain - Asia/Pacific with First Officer - Europe: Residual = -2.3 
 Unstable Approaches 
o Captain - Europe with First Officer - MENA: Residual = 6.0 
o Captain - Europe with First Officer - Europe: Residual = -4.5 
o Captain - Latin America & the Caribbean with  
First Officer - Asia / Pacific: Residual = -3.9 
o Captain - Latin America & the Caribbean with First Officer - Europe: 
Residual = 3.5 
o Captain - Asia/Pacific with First Officer - North America: Residual = 3.0 
o Captain - MENA with First Officer - MENA: Residual = -2.8 
o Captain - Europe with First Officer - North America: Residual = -2.7 
o Captain - Africa with First Officer - Europe: Residual = 2.5 
o Captain - Asia/Pacific with First Officer - MENA: Residual = -2.4 
o Captain - Latin America & the Caribbean with First Officer - MENA: 
Residual = 2.0 
 Pilot Deviations 
o Captain - Asia / Pacific with First Officer - MENA: Residual = -19.7 
o Captain - Asia / Pacific with First Officer - Asia / Pacific: Residual = 15.3 
o Captain - MENA with First Officer - MENA: Residual = 13.5 
o Captain - Europe with First Officer - Asia / Pacific: Residual = -13.3 
o Captain - Europe with First Officer - Europe: Residual = 11.9 
o Captain - Europe with First Officer - MENA: Residual = -5.6 
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o Captain - MENA with First Officer - Africa: Residual = -5.5 
o Captain - Europe with First Officer - Latin America & the Caribbean: 
Residual = 4.4 
o Captain - Asia / Pacific with First Officer - North America: Residual = 4.2 
o Captain - Africa with First Officer - Europe: Residual = -3.8 
o Captain - MENA with First Officer - Asia / Pacific: Residual = -3.6 
o Captain - Asia / Pacific with First Officer - Africa: Residual = 3.3 
o Captain - MENA with First Officer - Latin America & the Caribbean: 
Residual = -2.9 
o Captain - MENA with First Officer - North America: Residual = -2.3 
o Captain - Europe with First Officer - Africa: Residual = 2.0 
 Total 
o Captain - Asia / Pacific with First Officer - MENA: Residual = -22.3 
o Captain - Asia / Pacific with First Officer - Asia / Pacific: Residual = 18.2 
o Captain - Europe with First Officer - Asia / Pacific: Residual = -12.8 
o Captain - MENA with First Officer - MENA: Residual = 11.5 
o Captain - Europe with First Officer - Europe: Residual = 7.9 
o Captain - Asia / Pacific with First Officer - North America: Residual = 7.5 
o Captain - Europe with First Officer - Latin America & the Caribbean: 
Residual = 5.3 
o Captain - Asia / Pacific with First Officer - Europe: Residual = -5.2 
o Captain - Latin America & the Caribbean with First Officer - MENA: 
Residual = 5.1 
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o Captain - MENA with First Officer - Africa: Residual = -5.0 
o Captain - Latin America & the Caribbean with  
First Officer - Asia / Pacific: Residual = -3.8 
o Captain - MENA with First Officer - Asia / Pacific: Residual = -3.7 
o Captain - CIS with First Officer - MENA: Residual = 3.6 
o Captain - Africa with First Officer - MENA: Residual = 2.8 
o Captain - North America with First Officer - Asia / Pacific: Residual = 2.8 
o Captain - MENA with First Officer - Latin America & the Caribbean: 
Residual = -2.6 
o Captain - North America with First Officer - Africa: Residual = 2.5 
o Captain - Latin America & the Caribbean with First Officer - North 
America: Residual = -2.5 
o Captain - Africa with First Officer - Latin America & the Caribbean: 
Residual = -2.3 
o Captain - Asia / Pacific with First Officer - Africa: Residual = 2.2 
o Captain - North America with First Officer - Europe: Residual = -2.1 
There was a relationship between the above nationality combinations and unsafe 
performance events categories for pilot deviations and all unsafe performance events 
together.  This result indicated that the observed frequencies in these nationality 
combinations were different than the expected rate of unsafe performance events for the 
nationality combinations.  
Hypothesis 6.  The null hypothesis was that there was no significant association 
between cross-cultural (pilot nationality) group memberships on unsafe performance 
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events.  A discriminant analysis was conducted to review the association between cross-
cultural group memberships and unsafe performance events.  “The rationale behind 
discriminant analysis is to make use of existing data pertaining to group membership and 
relevant predictor variables to create a formula that will accurately predict group 
membership” (George & Mallery, 2000, p. 316). The results showed that there was a 
significant effect of some nationality combinations on unsafe performance events.  
Table 11 lists the nationality combinations that have a significant association with unsafe 
performance events. 
From the captain and first officer nationality combinations, the predicted group 
memberships for unsafe performance events are explained using Functions 1 and 2. The 
eigenvalues obtained for Functions 1 and 2 are 0.081 and 0.031, respectively, and the 
canonical correlation values for Functions 1 and 2 are .273 and .174 respectively.  
The group memberships among the nationality combinations that committed 
unsafe events are defined by the inclusion of the pairs within the discriminant analysis 
functions. The null hypothesis was rejected; therefore, there was a significant association 
between unsafe performance events and cross-cultural (pilot nationality) group 
memberships. Table 12 indicates the classification results for the three unsafe 
performance events, describing the original group memberships versus the predicted 
group memberships.  Overall, 73% of the original group cases were correctly classified; 
100% of the pilot deviation events were correctly predicted, whereas only 7.7% of the 
hard landings, and 1.7% of the unstable approaches were correctly predicted.  The only 
correctly predicted group memberships for hard landings and unstable approaches were 
for the nationality combinations that were found in Table 11. Figure 22 is a Territorial 
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Map for the Discriminant Functions indicating where the nationality combinations were 
more likely to appear. 
 
Table 11  
Nationality Combinations Associated with Unsafe Performance Events 
 
Captains First Officers 
Function 
1 
Function 
2 
MENA Africa 2.27 .63 
Latin America & the Caribbean Europe -.82 -2.11 
MENA MENA 3.36 8.67 
MENA North America 1.10 -.35 
Asia / Pacific MENA .48 1.24 
Africa Europe 2.05 .06 
Africa MENA 1.72 -.79 
Asia / Pacific Latin America & the Caribbean .99 2.54 
Asia / Pacific Asia / Pacific 3.36 8.67 
Africa North America .78 .74 
Asia / Pacific Europe .49 -.11 
Europe Asia / Pacific 2.28 -.17 
Asia / Pacific North America 6.76 -9.13 
CIS Asia / Pacific -.73 -1.90 
Europe Europe 3.36 8.67 
(Constant) -.485 .001 
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Table 12  
Discriminant Analysis Classification Results for Unsafe Performance Events  
 
 
Predicted Group Membership 
Total 
Hard 
Landings 
Unstable 
Approaches 
Pilot 
Deviation 
Original 
Group 
Membership 
Count Hard Landings 1 0 12 13 
Unstable Approaches 1 5 280 286 
Pilot Deviation 0 0 787 787 
% Hard Landings 7.7 .0 92.3 100.0 
Unstable Approaches .3 1.7 97.9 100.0 
Pilot Deviation .0 .0 100.0 100.0 
a. 73.0% of original grouped cases correctly classified. 
  
122 
Figure 22. Discriminant functions territorial map. 
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A Logistic Regression analysis was conducted and, based on the regression 
model, the output predicted 100% of the 787 pilot deviation events, as seen in Table 13.  
This result supports the output obtained from the Discriminant Analysis and corroborates 
the association between unsafe performance events and cross-cultural (pilot nationality) 
group memberships.  The null hypothesis was rejected; therefore, there was a significant 
association between unsafe performance events and cross-cultural (pilot nationality) 
group memberships.  
 
Table 13  
Logistic Regression Classification Results for Unsafe Performance Events 
 
 
 
 Observed 
Predicted Group Membership 
Total 
Hard 
Landings 
Unstable 
Approaches 
Pilot 
Deviation 
Hard Landings 1 0 12 13 
Unstable Approaches 1 0 285 286 
Pilot Deviation 0 0 787 787 
Overall Percentage 0.2 0 99.8 100.0 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The purpose of this dissertation was to determine if cross-cultural flight deck crew 
composition is related to increased error levels.  Data from an airline in the UAE was 
utilized to analyze the influence of cross-cultural pilots on operational safety.  
The airline industry is highly diversified, extremely safety-sensitive, and 
technologically driven.  Due to the complexities of air transportation, airlines have 
implemented fundamental training programs to attain and maintain safe operations 
including CRM, TEM, and SOPs (Salas, Bowers, & Edens, 2001).  Continuous 
improvements to these programs have been made as the industry strives to improve the 
safety of air travel.  In order to understand the influence of cross-cultural crew 
environment on pilot performance, it is crucial to study these programs and explore their 
impact on daily operations (Salas, Bowers, & Edens, 2001).  This section includes a 
summary of the results for the analyses conducted, followed by the conclusions and 
recommendations for future research and practices. 
Discussion 
The research design used for this study was an archival design utilizing existing 
organizational records (Vogt, Gardner, & Haettele, 2012).  An investigation was 
conducted into the association between unsafe performance events and captain / first 
officer nationality combinations during a flight where performance events were recorded.  
The flight data were retrieved from an unchanged flight data-recording environment 
yielding robust detailed data that was combined with administrative demographic data. 
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Population and Sample.  The population for the study was unsafe performance 
events for Air MENA between May 2011 and January 2013.  These unsafe performance 
events were only pilot related events.  All other events were eliminated from the data set.  
Purposive sampling ensured that data selection targeted crew based events that would aid 
in exploring the hypotheses (Babbie, 2010).  The population contained 1,863 unsafe 
performance events from a total of 1,149 pilots: 536 captains and 613 first officers.  The 
purposive sample contained 1,088 unsafe performance events that met the hypotheses: 
Harding Landings, Unstable Approaches, and Pilot Deviations and included 915 pilots: 
428 captains and 487 first officers. 
The Aerobytes program, the FDM software used at Air MENA, cannot provide 
the data to determine whether several unsafe events took place on the same flight in the 
provided data.  Therefore, each unsafe performance event was allocated a unique event 
identification number and each event was treated as an independent incident for data 
analyses.  
Some events were performed by the same captain / first officer combination on 
different flights.  The data set contained 660 events (61%) with duplicated captain ID 
numbers.  From the duplicated captain ID cases, less than 37% of captains were 
duplicated more than twice in the dataset.  For first officer, 601 events (55%) contained 
first officer ID number duplications, and from the duplicated first officer ID cases, less 
than 29% of first officers were duplicated more than twice in the dataset. 
Hypothesis Testing.  This study sought to answer the following research 
question: To what extent can we predict an unsafe performance event based on the 
nationality combination of pilots?  In order to answer this question, six hypotheses were 
  
126 
investigated.  The purpose of hypothesis testing in research is to determine the likelihood 
that a population parameter is true.  The null hypothesis was the alternative hypothesis to 
what was proposed as true.   
H1.  The null hypothesis was that there was no significant effect of the covariate 
age on the relationship between nationality combinations of captains / first officers and 
unsafe performance events.  In order to determine the degree of relationship between 
unsafe performance events and age, a Spearman’s r test was conducted.  This test 
provided the measure of strength and direction of any potential relationships between 
unsafe performance events and these intervening variables.  The Spearman’s r correlation 
test was ideal for non-parametric variables (Brace et al., 2009).  The findings showed that 
there was not a significant correlation between unsafe performance events and age of 
captains.  However, the findings showed that for the first officers’ age, there was a very 
weak statistically significant relationship between nationality combinations of pilots and 
unsafe performance events.  The relationship did not have practical significance, because 
it accounted for less than 1% of the variance.  This effect may have been due to the wider 
age range of first officers, or the lowest age of the first officers group (21 years). Age is a 
proxy variable for experience.  Due to the younger age of first officers in the data set 
(mean, median, and mode), the total experience level among pilots can be posited to be 
lower; therefore, the first officers were more susceptible to operational errors than ‘older’ 
captains who had more experience. 
In addition, an ANCOVA statistical test was conducted to control for the effect of 
age of captains / first officers on the relationship between nationality combination and 
unsafe performance events using the scaled variable, number of unsafe performance 
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events per (continent) nationality combination, and unsafe performance event.  The 
findings showed that the data violated the homogeneity of regression assumption for first 
officers’ age.  Therefore, the ANCOVA was not conducted.  
H2.  The null hypothesis was that there was no significant effect of the covariate 
airport destination on the relationship between nationality combinations of captains / first 
officers and unsafe performance events.  In order to determine the degree of relationship 
between unsafe performance events and destination airport, a Spearman’s r test was 
conducted.  A Spearman’s rank test indicated a weak relationship between airport 
destination and unsafe performance events accounting for less than 5% of the variance, 
where 36.67% of the events occurred at the Hub (59 unstable approaches and 340 pilot 
deviations).  The high number of events at the Hub may have occurred as a result of 
various factors not related to the cross-culture of the crewmembers, such as poor air 
traffic management, late night or early morning arrival times, training flights, and the 
relaxed flight deck environment when flying to their Hub that is developed as a result of 
familiarity of their base and the sense of ‘arriving home.’ 
In addition, an ANCOVA statistical test was conducted to control for the effect of 
airport destination on the relationship between nationality combination and unsafe 
performance events using the scaled variable, number of unsafe performance events per 
(continent) nationality combination, and unsafe performance event (Hard Landings, 
Unstable Approaches, and Pilot Deviation).  The findings showed that there was not a 
significant difference between unsafe performance events and nationality combinations 
when taking airport destination into account.  
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H3.  The null hypothesis was that there was no significant effect of the covariate 
eligibility to command the flight on the relationship between nationality combinations of 
captains / first officers and unsafe performance events.  In order to determine the degree 
of relationship between unsafe performance events and eligibility to command the flight, 
a Spearman’s r test was conducted.  There was a significant effect of the eligibility to 
command the flight on the relationship between nationality combinations and unsafe 
performance events that accounted for 9% of the variance.  In fact, 75% of the events 
occurred when either the captain or first officer was eligible to command the flight: six 
hard landings, 156 unstable approaches, and 654 pilot deviations. These results may have 
occurred due to low first officer experience as discussed for H1, training flights 
conducted with cadet pilots or new joiners, ATC, other CRM skills (workload 
management, situational awareness, communication skills, teamwork, briefing, etc.) 
lapses, or the influence of national culture. 
In addition, an ANCOVA statistical test was conducted to control for the effect of 
eligibility to command the flight on the relationship between nationality combination and 
unsafe performance events using the scaled variable, number of unsafe performance 
events per (continent) nationality combination, and unsafe performance event.  The 
findings showed that the data violated the assumption check of homogeneity of 
regression.  Therefore, the ANCOVA was not conducted. 
H4.  The null hypothesis was that there was no significant association between the 
frequency of homogeneous and the heterogeneous cross-cultural nationality combinations 
of captains / first officers on unsafe performance events.  The association between 
nationality combinations of captains / first officers and unsafe performance events was 
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investigated through a 2 by 3 multi-dimensional chi-square statistical test.  The aim was 
to check whether the frequency of homogeneous nationality combinations differed from 
the frequency of heterogeneous cross-cultural nationality combinations of captains/first 
officers on unsafe performance events.  
There was no significant association between the frequency of homogeneous and 
the heterogeneous cross-cultural nationality combinations of captains / first officers on 
unsafe performance events.  However, heterogeneous crewmembers triggered 72.65% of 
the unsafe performance events: nine hard landings, 219 unstable approaches, and 561 
pilot deviations. 
H5.  The null hypothesis was that there was no significant association between the 
frequencies of the nationality combinations of captains / first officers on unsafe 
performance events.  Using the 7 continent nationality combinations of captain and first 
officer, a 7 by 7 multi-dimensional chi-square was conducted.  There was no significant 
difference for hard landings or unstable approaches; there was a significant association 
for pilot deviations and all unsafe performance events in total.  For the significant unsafe 
performance events, nationality combinations that included either the captain or first 
officer were from Asia / Pacific, Europe, and MENA.  These nationality combinations 
appeared consistently among the top occurrences for unsafe performance events.  
H6.  The null hypothesis was that there was no significant association between 
cross-cultural (pilot nationality) group memberships on unsafe performance events.  
Discriminant analysis was used to predict category membership from the nationality 
combinations.  This analysis was used to predict which of the 49 nationality combination 
categories were more likely to commit unsafe performance events.  All of the pilot 
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deviations were correctly predicted using 15 captain / first officer nationality 
combinations.  Therefore, only pilot deviations were reliably predicted by the 
Discriminant Analysis and Logistic Regression.   
The discriminant analysis and logistic regression showed that there was a 
significant effect of some cross-cultural group memberships on unsafe performance 
events.  Nationality combinations of Asia / Pacific, Europe, and MENA appeared 
consistently, corroborating the findings from hypothesis 5. 
  Research Questions.  One research question was addressed in this study to 
identify possible relationships between cross-cultural crewmembers and unsafe 
performance events. 
 To what extent can we predict an unsafe performance event based on the 
nationality combination of pilots? 
Only pilot deviations could be reliably predicted using the 15 captain / first officer 
nationality combinations.  Hard landings had too few events (only 13 events).  The 
nationality combinations for unstable approaches were not significantly correlated and 
were not included in the analyses.  Therefore, unstable approaches could not be reliably 
predicted. 
Conclusion 
The results of this study indicated that captains’ age does not have a statistically 
significant effect on unsafe performance events.  However, the findings showed that there 
was a significant but weak relationship between unsafe performance events and age of 
first officers. This weak relationship may have been due to the younger age range among 
first officers, which equates to lower experience levels compared to captains.  
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Additionally, Air MENA facilitates a cadet pilot program where a majority of the cadets 
joining are below the age of 20 years.  Upon completion of the cadet pilot program, these 
pilots are still in the range of 20 - 22 years old with approximately 250 hours of total 
flight time.  This conclusion is supported by the fact that 50% of the unsafe performance 
events are committed on the narrow body fleet, the initial aircraft type for new first 
officers; 80% of the events are due to pilot deviations.  The inexperience of these pilots 
illustrates that the lack of precise aircraft handling skills may lead to excessive deviations 
of aircraft controls.  Moreover, their low experience levels may suggest that their CRM 
skills were less developed, and therefore; it was difficult to deal with crewmembers’ 
cultural differences.  
The results of this study indicated that there was a significant weak correlation 
between unsafe performance events and destination airport.  The Hub accounted for 
36.67% of the total number of destination airports where unsafe performance events 
occurred.  This result supports the previous conclusions, as a majority of the ‘low 
experienced’ pilots tend to perform the landings at the Hub due to familiarity. The Hub is 
known for unstandardized air traffic management, where pilots are usually provided with 
extensive radar vectors in addition to altitude and speed constraints during the final 
phases of the flight.  As a result, workload is increased during critical phases of the flight.  
If alternative approach procedures are not adequately briefed prior to commencing the 
descent phase, when ATC changes the expected approach, the pilot may not be prepared 
on multiple different levels (technical or non-technical), and therefore, could exceed an 
aircraft or SOP threshold. 
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As an international airline, Air MENA operates from its Hub that is centered 
between the Americas / Europe and Asia / Pacific. In order to optimize the network and 
improve the efficiency of connecting flights, the majority of the arrivals and departures 
are concentrated during two peak times: early mornings and late evenings. Early morning 
arrivals from the east provide connectivity to Europe and North America, and late 
evening arrivals from the west provide connectivity to the Indian Subcontinent, Asia, and 
the Pacific region.  Figure 23 depicts the pattern of arrivals and departures at the Hub. 
 
Figure 23. Arrival and departure patterns at hub.  
 
During these peak times, the local airspace is highly congested with arriving and 
departing traffic that may have resulted in heavy workloads during critical phases of 
flight.   Moreover, the majority of the arrivals at the Hub are during the early hours of the 
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morning, between 06:00 and 08:00.  Since these flights are conducted throughout the 
night, fatigue could have contributed to low performance level resulting in an unsafe 
performance event.  
The results of this study indicated that there was a significant relationship 
between unsafe performance events and eligibility to command the flight.  In fact, 75% of 
the unsafe performance events occurred at destination airports where captains and first 
officers were eligible to command the flights.  This result further indicates that the unsafe 
performance events were influenced by the national culture of the crew.   
Although the 2 by 3 multi-dimensional chi-square test indicated that there was no 
significant association between unsafe performance events and nationality combinations, 
the frequency of events by nationality combination types varied considerably.  In fact, 
heterogeneous nationality combinations accounted for 72.65% of the unsafe performance 
events.  Heterogeneous pilot combinations accounted for nine hard landings, 219 unstable 
approaches, and 561 pilot deviations, compared to homogeneous nationality 
combinations that accounted for four hard landings, 67 unstable approaches, and 226 
pilot deviations. Of the 15 nationality combinations that were significant, two were 
homogeneous and 13 were heterogeneous.  The majority of these combinations presented 
nationalities with high PDI and IDV dimensions.   
The aforementioned results buttress the literature that certain cultural traits and 
beliefs influence pilots’ behavior and attitudes and may jeopardize safety levels (Wise et 
al., 2010).  Defense systems, such as checklists and SOPs, may be weakened as a result 
of heterogeneous nationality combinations.  Additionally, heterogeneous nationality 
combinations may have experienced poor teamwork, communication skills, workload 
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management, or SOP applications during critical phases of the flight.  Consequently, 
cross-cultural crewmembers may have experienced mental exhaustion and tension as a 
result of misunderstanding, poor communication, excessive workload on one 
crewmember, or not paying attention to the flight controls. 
The results of this study indicated that there were significant associations between 
unsafe performance events and the frequencies of nationality combinations of captains / 
first officers.  Also, there was a significant association between unsafe performance 
events and cross-cultural group memberships.  As explained in the literature, Hofstede’s 
cultural dimensions expose the traits and attitudes for each national culture. Nationality 
combinations of Asia / Pacific, Europe, and MENA appeared consistently in the unsafe 
performance events.  Aligning these nationality combinations with Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions reveals that Asia / Pacific and MENA score high in PDI, whereas Europe 
scores high in IDV.  Nationality combinations with extreme PDI and IDV scores can 
jeopardize safety levels as a result of authoritarian characteristics and weak 
communication between crewmembers to avoid loss of ‘face’ and shame.  
Nationalities with a high PDI dimension tend to be from Asian nations such as 
China, South Korea, and Japan.  A recent example of an accident that involved 
nationality combinations with a high PDI dimension is Asiana Flight 214 in San 
Francisco in July 2013, where both South Korean pilots exerted high authoritarian 
behaviors (Croft, 2013).  Whereas, nations with a low IDV score, such as Colombia, 
Brazil, and Guatemala, tend to fulfill obligations to family / team members rather than 
focusing on oneself.  An example of an accident that involved a low IDV score is the 
crash of Avianca flight 52 in 1990, from Medellin to John F. Kennedy airport in New 
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York.  The crew did not declare a mayday regarding their critical fuel situation, as they 
did not feel comfortable being positioned ahead of the other traffic (Salas, Wilson, Burke, 
Wightman, & Howse, 2006). 
In summary, the analyses of the data gathered identified three significant aspects 
of the operations at Air MENA.   
 A majority of the unsafe performance events occurred at the Hub where 
captains and first officers can command the flight.  This result is a strong 
indication that these events were due to low experience levels by the first 
officers who have little experience in dealing with the CRM skills that can be 
highly influenced by national culture, along with aircraft handling and 
technical knowledge that are still being perfected. 
 Heterogeneous nationality combinations resulted in more unsafe performance 
events than homogeneous nationality combinations.  This result corroborates 
with the literature reviews’ discussion of the cross-cultural implications and 
its effect on safety performance. 
 Nationality combinations with high PDI and IDV scores significantly 
contributed to unsafe performance events in the data set; Table 14 lists the top 
three nationality combinations committing unsafe performance events by 
captains and first officers with high PDI or IDV.  Their authoritarian 
characteristics and individualistic attitudes may jeopardize the overall safety 
of the flight.  From the discriminant analysis group membership categories, 
captains and first officers from these three continents accounted for 46.67% 
and 66.67%, respectively, of the unsafe performance events. 
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Table 14  
High PDI or IDV Dimensions by Nationality Combinations 
 
 
Asia / 
Pacific 
Europe MENA Total 
Captain 21.3% 38.2% 15.2% 74.7% 
First Officer 22.8% 34.7% 27.0% 84.5% 
 
Recommendations 
Based on the results of this study, it was revealed that there is a significant 
association between unsafe performance events and first officers’ age.  Due to the first 
officers’ young age range, their experience level is considered to be low. As cadet pilots, 
they graduate from flight school with approximately 250 hours, which may contribute to 
the association between first officers’ age and unsafe performance events.  Air MENA’s 
cadet program should be reviewed to allow young cadets to gain more experience before 
operating on a jet aircraft.   
Increasing the age requirement for cadets alone would not solve the issue; 
Air MENA should consider collaboration with neighboring operators with turboprop 
aircraft. Integrating turboprop operations into the cadet program would enable cadet 
pilots to gain more experience and improve their flying skills prior to operating on a jet 
aircraft.  Allowing cadets to operate on turboprops would improve their transition to the 
jet aircraft by providing more hands-on-flying opportunities while being exposed to 
varying flight conditions, such as weather, terrain, ATC influences, language / accent 
barriers, etc. 
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The Hub airport contributed to 36.67% of the unsafe performance events.  
Coincidentally, captains and first officers are eligible to command the flight to the Hub 
airport.  In addition to the fact that first officers have been at the controls, two other 
important factors must be taken into consideration.  First, the Hub airport is known for 
having increased workload due to unstandardized air traffic management, particularly 
during peak hours by providing numerous radar vectors and altitude / speed constraints 
during critical phases of the flight.  It is recommended that Air MENA collaborate with 
the Hub’s Air Traffic Management to develop a structured and standardized arrival and 
departure procedures that would minimize ATC’s instructions during critical phases of 
the flight.  This standardization would reduce the workload on pilots and allow them to 
properly manage their flight.  As a result, errors committed by pilots and ATC should be 
minimized. 
Second, since Air MENA’s arrivals are either early mornings or late evenings, 
pilots are exposed to continuous variations in flight schedules.  Given the nature of Air 
MENA’s global network, pilots are exposed to multiple time zone changes.  It is 
recommended that Air MENA conduct a fatigue study to analyze the impact of flight 
schedules and time zone changes on pilots.  Fatigue, coupled with low experience levels, 
poor ATC management, and cross-cultural crewmembers, may impact the overall safety 
of Air MENA’s operations. 
The pilot population at Air MENA during the study’s time period included 97 
nationalities, the majority of which speak English as a second language.  In order to 
improve the communication skills among pilots, it is recommended that the GCAA 
increase the standards of required English skills to attain a commercial pilot license.  This 
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regulation improvement would facilitate better communication skills among pilots and 
avoid misunderstandings during critical phases of the flight. 
Dissemination of information may aid in increasing awareness and safety levels 
among pilots. Unsafe performance events records may be presented to the pilots in a form 
of safety bulletins, quarterly / annual reports, or destination specific safety factors that 
pilots can review and brief before arrival at the given destination. 
It is recommended that airlines adopt a new software that would function as a 
complete source for crewmembers’ information that ranges from basic information, such 
as date of birth and nationality, to committed events, flight patterns, and training records.  
This software would provide airlines with an easier method of data collection that would 
aid in identifying trends and operational deficiencies through reliable analyses. 
The current CRM syllabus at Air MENA encompasses the standard training 
elements with a focus on non-technical skills and TEM.  Because CRM is not culturally 
calibrated, it is recommended to develop a seventh generation for CRM that would 
include CCAAP in its training curriculum.  The seventh generation CRM, Cross-Cultural 
Crew Resource Management, or C3RM, would provide the standard non-technical skills 
and TEM training, while integrating CCAAP throughout the curriculum.  Figure 24 
depicts a flow chart of the seventh generation CRM.  A brief explanation of each element 
and the flow process are also depicted.  
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Figure 24. Seventh generation CRM. 
 
 
The CCAAP includes two phases: 
1. Cultural awareness training (CAT): The CAT program would incorporate 
national culture training based on Hofstede’s national culture dimensions 
into the sixth generation CRM program.  This training would aid in 
transferring cultural knowledge into daily airline operations. 
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2. Cultural action program (CAP):  The CAP would involve the evaluation of 
integrated cultural awareness training into normal line operations and 
training.   
a. The line operations phase would be known as Integrated Culture 
Evaluation (ICE) and can be conducted in parallel with a Line 
Operations Safety Audit (LOSA).  “A LOSA is a formal process 
that requires expert and highly trained observers to ride the jump 
seat during regularly scheduled flights to collect safety-related data 
on environmental conditions, operational complexity, and flight 
crew performance” (FAA, 2006b, p. 2). 
b. The training phase would be known as culture re-qualification 
program (CRP) that would be conducted in parallel with an AQP. 
Recommendations for Future Research.  Future research should examine the 
impact of additional covariates on the association between nationality combinations and 
unsafe performance events.  This approach would aid in providing an in-depth analysis of 
the effects of external factors on the association between nationality combinations and 
unsafe performance events.  The following is a list of possible covariates that may be 
explored further:   
1. Flight Hours: obtaining the total number of flights hours before and after 
joining the airline, and at the time of the unsafe performance event(s) 
would depict a clear picture of the level of experience attained by each 
pilot involved in unsafe performance events.  Also, categorizing these 
hours by fleet type would aid in conducting an in-depth analysis. 
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2. Training Records: obtaining training records for each pilot involved in 
unsafe performance events would provide viable quantitative and 
qualitative data that may be used for a more thorough analysis.  Moreover, 
future research should also review the type of commercial licenses 
obtained (FAA or JAA), location of training, and if the pilot has instructor 
credentials. 
3.  Fleet: incorporating fleet type as a covariate would provide essential 
information about the level of operations conducted per fleet. 
4. Arrival / Departure Times: reviewing arrival and departure times would 
aid in understanding flight schedules and how they may affect fatigue 
levels. 
5. Repetition of events by pilots: identifying repeated unsafe performance 
events and pilots who are continuously conducting unsafe performance 
events would aid in identifying potential trends and operational 
deficiencies.  
Future research may also conduct a FMAQ that is designed to address national, 
professional, and organizational cultures and identify their effects on cross-cultural pilot 
performances (Sexton et al., 2001).  In addition to FMAQ, conducting interviews with 
pilots involved in unsafe performance events would provide important qualitative 
information that would not be possible to attain from FOQA data.  Interaction with the 
human element involved in the study provides added value and strengthens the analyses. 
Depending on the availability of a LOSA program, LOSA records may be integrated in 
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the analysis of FMAQ in order to identify possible operational deficiencies according to 
various factors, such as fleet type, airport, and phase of flight. 
Reviewing training records would aid in identifying possible trends and 
deficiencies.  Training records are a valuable source of information and should be 
explored in future research.  This approach would allow the operators to develop 
operational defense systems through proactive and predictive safety strategies. 
Collecting and managing pilots’ information, such as flight time, flight schedules, 
and unsafe performance events, would aid in conducting more comprehensive analyses.  
This approach would take into account additional variables that may influence unsafe 
performance events.  It is recommended that airlines incorporate such variables in future 
research.  
Future research should analyze flights that do not involve unsafe performance 
events.  This approach would allow a comprehensive analysis of nationality combinations 
with and without unsafe performance events, while exploring various covariates.  
Incorporation of flights without unsafe performance events would strengthen the analysis 
by narrowing the type of nationality combinations that are prone to committing unsafe 
performance events. 
Finally, future research may also explore cross-cultural implications on cabin 
crew, ground engineers, and turn-around supervisors’ safety performance levels.  A 
research study that encompasses cabin crew and ground staff would provide a stronger 
picture of the overall operational status.   
The safety of daily operations is often impacted by factors such as on-time 
performance targets that would impose the ‘rush’ factor on different crewmembers.  
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Having cross-cultural crew in the flight deck, cabin, and on the ground presents 
formidable challenges that many airlines face today.
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Table C1 
Hofstede’s Cultural Dimension 
Country PDI IDV MAS UA 
ALGERIA 80 38 52 68 
ARGENTINA 49 46 56 86 
ARMENIA 66 37 45 85 
AUSTRALIA 36 90 61 51 
AUSTRIA 11 55 79 70 
BAHRAIN 90 25 50 80 
BANGLADESH 80 20 55 60 
BELGIUM 65 75 54 91 
BHUTAN 94 52 32 28 
BOLIVIA 69 38 49 76 
BOSNIA 73 33 40 80 
BOTSWANA 60 35 40 50 
BRAZIL 69 38 49 76 
BRUNEI DARUSSALAM 104 26 50 36 
BULGARIA 70 30 40 85 
CANADA 39 80 52 48 
CHILE 63 23 28 86 
CHINA 80 20 66 30 
COLOMBIA 67 13 64 80 
COSTA RICA 35 15 21 86 
COTE D IVOIRE 77 20 46 54 
CROATIA 73 33 40 80 
CYPRUS 66 37 45 85 
DENMARK 18 74 16 23 
DOMINICAN REP 65 30 65 45 
EGYPT 80 38 52 68 
EL SALVADOR 66 19 40 94 
ETHIOPIA 70 20 65 55 
FINLAND 33 63 26 59 
FRANCE 68 71 43 86 
FRENCH POLYNESIA 94 32 64 44 
GERMANY 35 67 66 65 
GREECE 60 35 57 112 
GUATEMALA 95 6 37 101 
HUNGARY 46 80 88 82 
INDIA 77 48 56 40 
INDONESIA 78 14 46 48 
IRAN 58 41 43 59 
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Country PDI IDV MAS UA 
IRAQ 95 30 70 85 
IRELAND 28 70 68 35 
ITALY 50 76 70 75 
JAMAICA 45 39 68 13 
JAPAN 45 39 68 13 
JORDAN 80 38 52 68 
Kenya 70 25 60 50 
KOREA S.(REP. OF) 60 18 39 85 
KUWAIT 90 25 40 80 
LEBANON 75 40 65 50 
MADAGASCAR 70 25 40 50 
MALAYSIA 104 26 50 36 
MALDIVES 77 48 56 40 
MALI 77 20 46 54 
MALTA 56 59 47 96 
MAURITIUS 70 25 40 50 
MEXICO 81 30 69 82 
MOLDOVA 90 30 42 90 
MOROCCO 70 25 53 68 
MOZAMBIQUE 60 35 40 50 
NEPAL 65 30 40 40 
NETHERLANDS 38 80 14 53 
NEW CALEDONIA 94 32 64 44 
NEW ZEALAND 22 79 58 49 
OMAN 95 25 60 80 
PAKISTAN 55 14 50 70 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 94 32 64 44 
PERU 64 16 42 87 
PHILIPPINES 94 32 64 44 
PORTUGAL 63 27 31 104 
QATAR 95 25 60 80 
ROMANIA 90 30 42 90 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 93 39 36 95 
SAUDI ARABIA 95 25 60 80 
SENEGAL 
77 20 46 54 
SERBIA & 
MONTENEGRO 
86 25 43 92 
SEYCHELLES 70 25 40 50 
SINGAPORE 74 20 48 8 
SLOVAKIA 104 52 110 51 
SLOVENIA 71 27 19 88 
SOUTH AFRICA 49 65 63 49 
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Country PDI IDV MAS UA 
SPAIN 57 51 42 86 
SRI LANKA 80 35 10 45 
SUDAN 80 38 52 68 
SWEDEN 31 71 5 29 
SWITZERLAND 34 68 70 58 
SYRIAN ARAB REP 80 38 52 68 
TAIWAN 58 17 45 69 
THAILAND 64 20 34 64 
TRINIDAD AND 
TOBAGO 
47 16 58 55 
TUNISIA 80 38 52 68 
TURKEY 66 37 45 85 
UGANDA 70 20 65 55 
UKRAINE 93 39 36 95 
UNITED ARAB 
EMIRATES 
90 25 50 80 
UNITED KINGDOM 35 89 66 35 
UNITED STATES 40 91 62 46 
VENEZUELA 81 12 73 76 
YEMEN 95 25 60 80 
YUGOSLAVIA 86 25 43 92 
ZAMBIA 60 35 40 50 
ZIMBABWE 60 35 40 50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
172 
 
Table C2 
List of Variables 
Variable Name Variable Components Used in 
Analyses 
Code 
Event_ID ID number of incident / event No No 
Flight_No Flight number No No 
Fleet Aircraft type, 5 categories: A320, A330, 
A340, and B777 
Yes 5 categories 
from 1 - 5 
Aircraft_Reg Registration number of Aircraft No No 
Depart_Airport Departure airport, 181 airports Yes 181 categories 
from 1 - 181 
Destination Destination / arrival airport, 181 airports Yes 181 categories 
from 1 - 181 
TO_Date Takeoff Date (Day-Month_Year) Yes No 
Arr_Date Arrival Date (Day-Month_Year) Yes No 
Peak_Time Peak time (Day-Month_Year) No No 
Status Status of incident / event: indicating the 
validity of the event to be used in the data: 
Only valid events were included in the 
dataset. 
Yes No 
Event_Name Name of incident / event; 69 different 
events, with only 49 events relevant to the 
study: 
Abnormal Pitch (Low), Abnormal Sink 
Rate, Abnormal Vertical G with Flap, 
Approach Speed High (<500ft), Approach 
Speed High (pre Go Around), Approach 
Speed Low (<1000ft), Approach Speed Low 
(<500ft), Brakes used during takeoff, Climb 
out speed high, Climb out speed low, 
Deviation above glideslope, Deviation 
below glideslope, Dual Side Stick Input 
(Pitch), Dual Side Stick Input (Roll), Early 
Yes 69 categories 
from 1 - 69 
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Variable Name Variable Components Used in 
Analyses 
Code 
config change after takeoff (height), 
Excessive bank, Excessive bank after 
takeoff (<1000ft), Excessive bank after 
takeoff (<500ft), Excessive bank after 
takeoff (<50ft), Excessive bank on approach 
(<500ft), Excessive Bank on landing  
(at touchdown), Excessive Bank on landing 
(below Flare Ht), Flap Placard Speed 
Exceeded, Gear Extension Speed Exceeded, 
Gear Limiting Speed Exceeded, Gear 
Retraction Speed Exceeded, GPWS 
(GLIDESLOPE), GPWS (SINK RATE), 
GPWS (TOO LOW FLAPS), High rate of 
descent (<1000ft), High rate of descent 
(<500ft), Late Initial Stabilisation 
 (Ht AAL), Late land flap (height AAL), 
Late land gear, Late T/R Cancellation, Low 
power on approach, Max operating altitude 
exceeded, Overweight Landing, Pitch Low 
(approach), Reverse Not Deployed After 
Landing, Rough taxiing, Speed Brake not 
armed for landing, Takeoff Weight Limit 
Exceedance, Unstable approach (roll), and 
Vmo/Mmo Exceeded. 
Value_Name Specific kind of incident / event; 71 
different categories: Airspeed - max vs 
Vapp below 500 ft, Airspeed - max vs Vapp 
pre-Go Around, Airspeed - max vs Vfe  
(2 secs), Airspeed - max vs Vle (2 secs), 
Airspeed - max vs Vlo ext (2 secs), 
Airspeed - max vs Vlo ret (2 secs),  
Airspeed - max vs Vref (500 to 50ft), 
No No 
174 
 
Variable Name Variable Components Used in 
Analyses 
Code 
Airspeed - min vs Vapp below 500 ft, 
Airspeed - min vs Vls below 1000 ft, 
Airspeed - min vs Vls below 500 ft, 
Airspeed - min vs Vref (1000 to Flare), 
Airspeed - vs Max for Altitude (SOP), 
Airspeed - vs V2 (highest <1,000ft RAL, 
Airspeed - vs V2 (lowest <1,000ft RALT, 
Airspeed - vs V2 at 1st Config Change, 
Alpha Floor; Altitude - max vs ceiling, 
Brake Pedal – sum; Distance - until t/d from 
50ft RALT, Distance - until t/d from  
flare ht, Flap - landing flap AAL, Flap - 
landing flap AAL (ignoring RALT), Fuel 
Flow – Min, Gear - down AAL, 
Groundspeed - max (5 secs); Groundspeed 
at T/R cancel, GS Dev - max  
(below 1000 ft), GS Dev - max (below 
500ft), GS Dev - min (below 500ft), Height 
above rwy - config change, Lateral G -  
max abs, Longitudinal G - max abs, Mach - 
max vs Mmo, N1 - min (500ft to 50ft), No 
Reverse After Landing, Pilot Event, Pitch - 
min (1000 to 500ft), Pitch - most –ve, Rad 
Alt - min (Glideslope), Rad Alt - min 
(GPWS Active), Rad Alt - min (Sink Rate), 
Rad Alt - min (Terrain), Rad Alt - min (Too 
Low Flap), Rad Alt - min (Too Low 
Terrain), Radio Ht - min during Go Around, 
Roll – max, Roll - max (1500 to 1000ft), 
Roll - max (50 to 500ft), Roll - max (500 to 
1000ft), Roll - max (500 to 50ft), Roll - max 
(at touchdown), Roll - max (below 50ft), 
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Variable Name Variable Components Used in 
Analyses 
Code 
Roll - max (below flare ht), Side Stick 
Product (Pitch), Side Stick Product (Roll), 
Sink Rate - max (1000 to 500ft), Sink Rate - 
max (2000 to 1000ft), Sink Rate - max 
(below 500ft), Spoilers - not armed, Stable 
Approach - Ht AAL (first stable), TCAS RA 
(duration), TCAS TA (duration), Tyre 
Speed - max vs limit, Vertical G – largest, 
Vertical G - largest with flap, Vertical G - 
most –ve, Vertical G - most +ve, Vertical 
Speed - max sink (10 secs), Weight vs Max 
Landing (specific a/c), Weight vs Max 
Takeoff, and Windshear Active. 
State_Name Specific kind of value of incident / event; 16 
different categories. 
No No 
Type Type of incident / event; 7 different 
categories: Speed, Acceleration, Flight Path, 
Attitude, Power, Configuration, and 
Warnings. 
Yes 7 categories 
from 1 - 7 
Phase Phase incident / event took place; 5 different 
phases: Air, Entire Phase, Ground, Landing 
and Approach, Takeoff and Climb. 
Yes 5 categories 
from 1 - 5 
Severity Severity of incident / event as a percentage, 
coded into three categories: Minor (less than 
51), Major (between 51 and 74), and 
Critical (between 75 and 100). 
Yes 3 categories 
from 1 - 3 
Value Speed of aircraft No No 
Units Units of Speed of aircraft No No 
Capt1_ID Captain ID number; this information is 
stored in a different secure data file to 
ensure anonymity and confidentiality. 
No No 
CP1AGE Age of captain in years Yes No 
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Variable Name Variable Components Used in 
Analyses 
Code 
CP1NAT Nationality of captain  Yes 7 continents 
Capt1Country Country of captain No No 
FO1_ID First officer ID number; this information is 
stored in a different secure data file to 
ensure anonymity and confidentiality. 
No No 
FO1AGE Age of First Officer in years Yes No 
FO1NAT Nationality of first officer Yes 7 continents 
FO1Country Country of first officer No No 
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Table C3 
 
Categories of Unsafe Performance Events 
Specific Incident 
Minor 
Severity 
Major 
Severity 
Critical 
Severity Total 
% within 
Category 
Unsafe Performance Event Category: Hard Landings 
Vertical G - largest with flap 0 13 0 13 100% 
Unsafe Performance Event Category: Unstable Approaches 
Flap - landing flap AAL 0 61 2 63 22.0% 
Sink Rate - max (1000 to 500ft) 0 38 0 38 13.3% 
Airspeed - max vs Vref (500 to 50ft) 15 14 0 29 10.1% 
GS Dev - max (below 500ft) 0 9 18 27 9.4% 
Sink Rate - max (below 500ft) 0 25 0 25 8.7% 
Rad Alt - min (Glideslope) 0 23 0 23 8.0% 
Roll - max (500 to 50ft) 0 9 8 17 5.9% 
Airspeed - max vs Vapp below 500 ft 7 9 0 16 5.6% 
Airspeed - max vs Vapp pre-Go 
Around  0 11 0 11 3.8% 
Roll - max (below flare ht) 0 2 7 9 3.1% 
Gear - down AAL 0 5 0 5 1.7% 
GS Dev - max (below 1000 ft) 4 0 1 5 1.7% 
Rad Alt - min (Sink Rate) 0 4 0 4 1.4% 
Airspeed - min vs Vapp below 500 ft 1 1 0 2 0.7% 
Airspeed - min vs Vls below 500 ft  0 1 1 2 0.7% 
N1 - min (500ft to 50ft) 1 1 0 2 0.7% 
Rad Alt - min (Too Low Flap) 0 2 0 2 0.7% 
Airspeed - min vs Vls below 1000 ft 0 0 1 1 0.3% 
Airspeed - min vs Vref (1000 to Flare) 1 0 0 1 0.3% 
Flap - landing flap AAL  0 1 0 1 0.3% 
Roll - max (1500 to 1000ft) 1 0 0 1 0.3% 
Roll - max (at touchdown) 0 0 1 1 0.3% 
Stable Approach - Ht AAL 1 0 0 1 0.3% 
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Specific Incident 
Minor 
Severity 
Major 
Severity 
Critical 
Severity Total 
% within 
Category 
Unsafe Performance Event Category: Pilot Deviation 
Sidestick Product (Pitch) 0 53 173 226 28.6% 
Airspeed - vs Max for Altitude (SOP) 4 44 57 105 13.3% 
Sidestick Product (Roll) 0 5 49 54 6.8% 
No Reverse After Landing 0 0 50 50 6.3% 
Airspeed - vs V2  0 46 0 46 5.8% 
Spoilers - not armed 0 46 0 46 5.8% 
Airspeed - max vs Vfe (2 secs) 0 40 0 40 5.1% 
Airspeed - vs V2  4 36 0 40 5.1% 
Roll - max 9 15 11 35 4.4% 
Vertical Speed - max sink (10 secs) 0 33 0 33 4.2% 
Groundspeed - max (5 secs) 5 21 0 26 3.3% 
Sink Rate - max (2000 to 1000ft) 0 17 0 17 2.2% 
Roll - max (50 to 500ft) 0 7 6 13 1.6% 
Weight vs Max Landing (specific a/c) 0 11 0 11 1.4% 
Brake Pedal - sum 3 6 0 9 1.1% 
Groundspeed at T/R cancel 0 7 0 7 0.9% 
Lateral G - max abs 0 6 0 6 0.8% 
Longitudinal G - max abs 1 5 0 6 0.8% 
Height above rwy - config change 1 3 0 4 0.5% 
Airspeed - max vs Vlo ext (2 secs) 0 3 0 3 0.4% 
Pitch - most -ve 2 1 0 3 0.4% 
Altitude - max vs ceiling 0 2 0 2 0.3% 
Mach - max vs Mmo 0 1 1 2 0.3% 
Airspeed - vs V2 at 1st Config Change 0 1 0 1 0.1% 
Pitch - min (1000 to 500ft) 1 0 0 1 0.1% 
Roll - max (500 to 1000ft) 0 1 0 1 0.1% 
Roll - max (below 50ft) 0 1 0 1 0.1% 
Weight vs Max Takeoff 0 0 1 1 0.1% 
Total by Severity  61 640 387 1088   
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Table C4 
 
List of Continents by Nationalities 
Continent  Code Nationality 
Africa 1 Motswana, Algerian, Ethiopian, 
Kenyan, Mozambican, Seychellois, 
Ugandan, South African, 
Zimbabwe, Mauritian,   
Cote D l’voire, Malian, and 
Senegalese. 
Asia / Pacific 2 Australian, Bangladeshi, 
Indonesian, Indian, South Korean, 
Sri Lankan, Malaysian,  
New Zealander, Pakistani, Filipino, 
Papa New Guinea, Singaporean, 
Thai, Taiwanese, Bhutanese, 
Maldivian, Nepalese,  
French Polysian, Bruneian, 
Chinese, and New Caledonian. 
CIS  3 Moldovan, Russian, and Ukrainian. 
Europe 4 Belgian, Bulgarian, Swiss, Cypriot, 
German, Spanish, French, British, 
Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, 
Maltese, Dutch, Portuguese, 
Swedish, Turkish, Danish, Finish, 
Romanian, Slovakian, Austrian, 
Bosnian & Herzegovin, 
Yugoslavian, Serbian & 
Montenegrin, Dutch, Maltese, and 
Croatian. 
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Continent  Code Nationality 
Latin American & the Caribbean 5 Bolivian, Brazilian, Chilean, 
Colombian, Costa Rican, 
Guatemalan, Jamaican, Mexican, 
Peruvian, Salvadorian,  
Trinidad & Tobago, Venezuelan, 
Argentinean, and Dominican. 
Middle-East & North Africa 6 Emirati, Egyptian, Jordanian, 
Lebanese, Moroccan, Sudanese, 
Syrian, Tunisian, Qatari,  
Saudi Arabian, Yemeni, Bahraini, 
Iraqi, Kuwaiti, and Omani. 
North America 7 Canadian and American 
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Table C5 
Destination Airports by Category 
Pilot Eligibility Category by Destination 
A B C 
Abu Dhabi Almaty Addis Ababa 
Ahmedabad Amman (Queen Alia) Kathmandu 
Alexandria (Borg El Arab) Astana Peshawar 
Amsterdam Baghdad Seychelles 
Athens Basrah 
 Bahrain Beirut 
 Bangalore Benghazi 
 Bangkok Calicut 
 Beijing Chicago 
 Belgrade Damascus 
 Berlin Tegel Djibouti 
 Brisbane Eldoret 
 Brussels Erbil 
 Bucharest Geneva 
 Cairo Guangzhou 
 Cape Town Hong Kong 
 Casablanca Islamabad 
 Chengdu Istanbul Sabiha Gokcen 
 Chennai Jakarta 
 Cochin Johannesburg 
 Colombo Karachi 
 Copenhagen Khartoum 
 Dammam  Kuala Lumpur 
 Delhi Lagos 
 Dhaka Larnaca 
 Doha Manila 
 Dublin Mauritius 
 Dusseldorf Melbourne 
 Frankfurt Hahn Moscow Domodedovo 
 Frankfurt Main Mumbai 
 Ho Chi Minh N'Djamena 
 Hyderabad  Nairobi 
 Istanbul Ataturk New York Kennedy Intl 
 Jeddah Sao Paulo 
 Kuwait Stuttgart 
 Lahore Tehran 
 London Heathrow Thessaloniki 
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Pilot Eligibility Category by Destination 
A B C 
Male Thiruvananthapuram 
 Manchester Zurich 
 Milan Malpensa 
  Minsk -2 
  Munich 
  Muscat 
  Nagoya 
  Paris Charles-De-Gaulle 
  Riyadh 
  Rome 
  Seoul 
  Shanghai 
  Singapore 
  Stockholm 
  Sydney 
  Tokyo 
  Tripoli 
  Vienna 
  Washington Dulles Intl 
  Yangon 
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Table C6 
Coefficients 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 
(Constant) 25.840 1.226  21.082 .000   
V1NatCombination1_1
Continent Capt 1 FO 1 
10.160 9.780 .029 1.039 .299 .987 1.014 
V2NatCombination1_2
Continent Capt 1 FO 2 
-3.261 4.046 -.023 -.806 .420 .922 1.085 
V4NatCombination1_4
Continent Capt 1 FO 4 
1.838 3.404 .016 .540 .589 .889 1.124 
V5NatCombination1_5
Continent Capt 1 FO 5 
-5.674 6.970 -.023 -.814 .416 .974 1.027 
V6NatCombination1_6
Continent Capt 1 FO 6 
-8.490 3.953 -.061 -2.148 .032 .918 1.090 
V7NatCombination1_7
Continent Capt 1 FO 7 
14.160 16.851 .023 .840 .401 .995 1.005 
V8NatCombination2_1
Continent Capt 2 FO 1 
3.293 4.509 .021 .730 .465 .937 1.067 
V9NatCombination2_2
Continent Capt 2 FO 2 
4.027 2.215 .058 1.818 .069 .741 1.350 
V11NatCombination2_
4Continent Capt 2 FO 4 
3.199 2.067 .051 1.548 .122 .703 1.423 
V12NatCombination2_
5Continent Capt 2 FO 5 
5.118 3.643 .040 1.405 .160 .903 1.107 
V13NatCombination2_
6Continent Capt 2 FO 6 
-3.278 2.718 -.036 -1.206 .228 .827 1.209 
V14NatCombination2_
7Continent Capt 2 FO 7 
1.826 4.509 .011 .405 .686 .937 1.067 
V16NatCombination3_
2Continent Capt 3 FO 2 
-21.840 16.851 -.036 -1.296 .195 .995 1.005 
V18NatCombination3_
4Continent Capt 3 FO 4 
-4.840 11.947 -.011 -.405 .685 .991 1.009 
V20NatCombination3_
6Continent Capt 3 FO 6 
-5.674 6.970 -.023 -.814 .416 .974 1.027 
V22NatCombination4_
1Continent Capt 4 FO 1 
-4.068 3.787 -.031 -1.074 .283 .911 1.098 
V23NatCombination4_
2Continent Capt 4 FO 2 
.433 2.041 .007 .212 .832 .696 1.437 
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Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
V26NatCombination4_
5Continent Capt 4 FO 5 
4.537 2.789 .049 1.627 .104 .836 1.197 
V27NatCombination4_
6Continent Capt 4 FO 6 
-.939 1.908 -.017 -.492 .623 .653 1.531 
V28NatCombination4_
7Continent Capt 4 FO 7 
-1.994 4.820 -.012 -.414 .679 .945 1.059 
V29NatCombination5_
1Continent Capt 5 FO 1 
7.826 6.970 .031 1.123 .262 .974 1.027 
V30NatCombination5_
2Continent Capt 5 FO 2 
.360 3.094 .003 .116 .907 .866 1.155 
V32NatCombination5_
4Continent Capt 5 FO 4 
4.866 2.524 .059 1.928 .054 .800 1.251 
V33NatCombination5_
5Continent Capt 5 FO 5 
-.340 4.147 -.002 -.082 .935 .925 1.081 
V34NatCombination5_
6Continent Capt 5 FO 6 
-1.420 2.674 -.016 -.531 .595 .821 1.218 
V35NatCombination5_
7Continent Capt 5 FO 7 
18.160 16.851 .030 1.078 .281 .995 1.005 
V36NatCombination6_
1Continent Capt 6 FO 1 
-5.340 11.947 -.012 -.447 .655 .991 1.009 
V37NatCombination6_
2Continent Capt 6 FO 2 
-.182 2.897 -.002 -.063 .950 .847 1.180 
V38NatCombination6_
3Continent Capt 6 FO 3 
1.160 16.851 .002 .069 .945 .995 1.005 
V39NatCombination6_
4Continent Capt 6 FO 4 
4.947 2.405 .064 2.058 .040 .779 1.283 
V40NatCombination6_
5Continent Capt 6 FO 5 
10.215 4.147 .070 2.464 .014 .925 1.081 
V41NatCombination6_
6Continent Capt 6 FO 6 
-4.110 2.447 -.052 -1.680 .093 .787 1.271 
V42NatCombination6_
7Continent Capt 6 FO 7 
4.160 9.780 .012 .425 .671 .987 1.014 
V43NatCombination7_
1Continent Capt 7 FO 1 
-15.440 7.615 -.056 -2.028 .043 .978 1.023 
V44NatCombination7_
2Continent Capt 7 FO 2 
-5.507 4.147 -.038 -1.328 .184 .925 1.081 
V46NatCombination7_
4Continent Capt 7 FO 4 
2.812 3.713 .022 .757 .449 .907 1.103 
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Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
V47NatCombination7_
5Continent Capt 7 FO 5 
-3.269 6.469 -.014 -.505 .613 .969 1.032 
V48NatCombination7_
6Continent Capt 7 FO 6 
-2.785 4.147 -.019 -.672 .502 .925 1.081 
a. Dependent Variable: Event_name_New Name of event / Incident 
 
 
186 
 
Table C7 
 
Casewise Diagnostics 
Case Number Std. Residual Event_name_New 
Name of event / 
Incident 
Predicted 
Value 
Residual 
6 2.236 62 24.42 37.580 
22 2.029 59 24.90 34.098 
205 2.029 59 24.90 34.098 
290 2.162 62 25.66 36.341 
318 2.236 62 24.42 37.580 
354 2.207 62 24.90 37.098 
359 2.126 62 26.27 35.726 
380 2.346 62 22.58 39.421 
459 2.347 62 22.56 39.437 
476 2.139 59 23.06 35.944 
537 2.215 59 21.77 37.227 
591 2.126 62 26.27 35.726 
611 2.218 59 21.73 37.270 
626 2.152 62 25.84 36.160 
668 2.509 68 25.84 42.160 
693 2.029 59 24.90 34.098 
708 2.396 62 21.73 40.270 
773 2.207 62 24.90 37.098 
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Case Number Std. Residual Event_name_New 
Name of event / 
Incident 
Predicted 
Value 
Residual 
788 2.270 62 23.85 38.154 
802 2.162 62 25.66 36.341 
808 2.011 60 26.20 33.800 
813 2.033 60 25.84 34.160 
820 2.317 62 23.06 38.944 
825 2.478 59 17.35 41.650 
897 2.249 64 26.20 37.800 
927 2.311 59 20.17 38.833 
948 2.029 59 24.90 34.098 
1010 2.378 69 29.04 39.961 
1014 2.152 62 25.84 36.160 
1040 2.033 60 25.84 34.160 
1100 2.396 62 21.73 40.270 
1147 2.207 62 24.90 37.098 
1210 2.207 62 24.90 37.098 
1287 2.624 69 24.90 44.098 
1295 2.042 62 27.68 34.321 
1299 2.007 60 26.27 33.726 
1308 2.162 62 25.66 36.341 
1314 2.396 62 21.73 40.270 
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APPENDIX D 
Figures 
D1 Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual 
D2 Scatterplot
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Figure D1. Normal P-P Plot of Regression Residual. 
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Figure D2. Scatterplot. 
